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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
"Reform of the election system is often advocated but seldom accomplished. A 
major difficulty is that the parties and members currently in parliament are 
the very ones whose consent is required to enact changes" (David M. Olson 
1994: 97) 
 
In 1999 Indonesia held its first free elections since 1955. The transition to this 
democratic event started with the Asian Crisis, which led Indonesia into a period of 
deep economical, social and political unrest that forced President Suharto to give up 
his 32-years long presidency on May 21st 1998.   
Many leaders of the nations of the world warmly welcomed the democratic election 
that was held in June. My question is regarding what kind of democracy did 
Indonesia enter into? And furthermore: Were the election laws formed in such a way 
that they could secure the right of every major political group to contest the election, 
and let every Indonesian have the same the right to vote and to become elected? 
This thesis will concentrate on the drafting process of the three new electoral laws 
that were adopted on January 28th 1999. These laws formed the framework for the 
elections that were held later on the same year. A lot of the research on democracy 
within the political science focuses on the election itself or the transition to 
democracy in a wider perspective, but very little attention has been paid on the 
formation of the laws that regulate the elections. I will argue that it is important to 
focus on the election laws because they make a great impact on the possibilities that 
different political parties and oppositional groups have to contest an election and to 
gain seats in parliament. Bernhard Grofman and Arend Lijphart say that the little 
recognition in electoral studies is remarkable because of the fact that "institutions can 
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constrain and structure political choices in a fundamental way" (Grofman and 
Lijphart 1986: 15). 
It is particularly interesting to study this process of transition to democracy in the 
situation where members of a non-democratic elected parliament suddenly have to 
decide on the rules for a democratic election. This paradox was the situation in 
Indonesia, where the Golkar-dominated1 parliament formed the laws that paved the 
way for the first multi-party democratic elections in decades. One can just wonder if 
it is possible for authoritarianists to overnight become sworn democrats who have to 
build the foundation for a parliamentary system which may lead to their own 
downfall.  
In this introduction I will first give a brief overview over the historical events that led 
to the political crisis in which President Suharto was forced from power. Thereafter I 
will in the next chapter continue by presenting the research question and the new 
election laws. 
1.1 A country in crisis 
The Asian economic crisis started with the devaluation of the Thai currency Baht in 
the summer 1997. The economic problems hit almost every national economy in the 
countries in Southeast Asia, and it developed into a political and social crisis in some 
of them.  
The crisis affected Indonesia more than any other country in the region. During the 
autumn of 1997 the Indonesian currency, rupiah, started to loose its value rapidly, 
and the country went into a period of social, political and economical instability. 
There were hard pressures for reform both from the Indonesian people and from 
international organisations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded 
                                              
1 Golkar is the party of the former president Suharto. The election laws in Suharto’s presidency were continuously changed 
in order to make sure that Golkar would have the majority of the seats in the parliament   
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reforms in the banking sector and other fields of the economy in order to give 
financial support to Indonesia, and when rice, fuel and other commodities became 
more expensive and more workers became unemployed, people started to protest all 
over the archipelago. The demonstrations continued in all the major cities, and turned 
after some time its focus from demanding lower prices to also demanding democracy 
and reform. The students at the different universities were among the most active 
group demonstrating in hope of bringing Suharto’s New Order-politic to an end. The 
military (ABRI) which was feared for its previous killings of opposition groups, 
stayed aside from some instigating incidents, surprisingly calm when the student 
demonstrations culminated in early May 1998.  
When Suharto stepped down on May 21st, there was little enthusiasm for his 
successor, Vice-president Jusuf B. Habibie, and therefore the students continued to 
demonstrate for democracy and reforms. Four days after Habibie came to power he 
promised that there would be new elections in Indonesia within a year, and that a 
reform of the election laws was necessary in order to give the opposition a fair 
opportunity to contest the election. So after 32 years with a sovereing one-party rule 
under president Suharto, the process of making the new election laws lasted for only 
eight months until the end of January 1999, when three new laws were adopted in the 
parliament. 
1.2 The history of the political system in Indonesia 
Like many other previous colonised countries, modern Indonesian political history 
started with a group of people who gathered to fight their European occupant. In the 
case of Indonesia, the occupants were the Netherlands. The Dutch East Indian 
Company founded Batavia, the city which today is the capital Jakarta, in 1619. At 
that time the Indonesian archipelago consisted of several different small powers that 
were fighting eachother. Within the next three centuries The Dutch state took over 
rule from the East Indian Company and the different islands in the vast archiepelago 
came under Dutch rule.  
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At the beginning of the 20th century the opposition against the Dutch rule was 
formed. Nevertheless, at the beginning of World War II, The Netherlands Indies, as 
Indonesia was called, was more or less in the same political stabile situation as 
Indonesia seemed to be in before the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997. To quote David 
Joel Steinberg (1987: 418) Indonesia in 1941 “was in a nearly perfect state of what 
the Dutch called rust en orde, calm and order. The rapid changes of the previous 
decades, while creating deep social tensions, had not shaken colonial stability. Dutch 
rule, occasionally disturbed earlier in the century, was secure and nowhere effectively 
challenged from within”.  
In 1941 the Japanese occupied Indonesia, ended the old order, and put aside the 
political and economical elite. Througout the war two prewar leaders, Sukarno and 
Mohammed Hatta, worked harder to spread the nationalist idea of Indonesia. At June 
1st 1945 Sukarno held his famous Pancasila-speech, and only two days after the 
Japanese rule ended, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia on 
August 17th 1945. The former colonists reacted on this proclamation and tried to 
regain their prewar rule. Indonesia therefore went into a period of struggle where a lot 
of people fought for a total political independence, and finally Indonesia became 
independent in 1949.  
1.2.1 The Pancasila 
Sukarno promulgated Pancasila as a recipe for Indonesian patriotism in a speech he 
gave to the Independence Preparatory Committee on June 1st 1945. He thus helped 
solve the conflict between Muslims, nationalists and Christians. The 1945 
Constitution then set forth the Pancasila as the embodiment of basic principles of an 
independent Indonesian state. The Pancasila would later become the basic ideology 
for Indonesian politics in both Sukarno and Suharto’s presidencies. 
The Five Principles (Pancasila means Five Principles): 
1. Belief in the one and only God (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) 
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2. Just and civilized humanity (Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab) 
3. The unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia) 
4. Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives (Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh 
Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan) 
5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia (Keadilan Sosial bagi 
Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia) 
 
1.2.2 The 1955-election and political turmoils 
After independence in 1949, Sukarno and Hatta were in power and worked to held a 
free and fair election. The first multiparty election was held in 1955. The election was 
“a great success as an act of popular franchise” (Steinberg et.al 1987: 423), but due to 
political turmoils througout Indonesia, the first election also became the last free 
election before June 1999.  In the years to come, the Communist Party (PKI) gained 
more support, the army got wider administrative powers with a declaration of martial 
law, and president Sukarno showed his power when he inaugurated what he called a 
“Guided Democracy”.  
“Guided Democracy” represented an alliance between the army, Sukarno and the 
support of PKI. In 1965 this alliance was shakened when the army showed their 
power. Hundreds of thousands of PKI-supporters were massacred, and on March 11th 
1966 Sukarno was replaced as president by General Suharto. Suharto’s new policy 
for Indonesia was called the “New Order”, and this regime lasted until Suharto was 
forced to step down on May 21st 1998.  
1.3 The “New order” as it was when Suharto left 
Suharto’s New Order policy was a political system where only three political parties 
were allowed to contest the general elections. One of them was the governmental 
party, Golkar, which always got more than 90 percent of the votes. The two other 
 14 
parties were the United Development Party, PPP, and the Indonesian Democratic 
Party (PDI). Both of them had, as for all other social and political organisations, to 
recognise Pancasila as their sole fundeamental ideological foundation. Suharto ruled 
with the support of his own party, Golkar, and by the military, ABRI. 
400 out of the 500 seats in the parliament, DPR, were contested in the general 
elections. The last 100 seats were reserved for representatives from the military who 
Suharto appointed. The president and vice-precident were elected by the legislative 
body, the MPR. There were 1000 members in this body, and it consisted of the 500 
members of the parliament and 500 representatives of different functional groups and 
representatives of the 27 provinces of Indonesia. Suharto appointed these 500 
delegates and the 100 military members of the parliament, and hence he himself 
controlled the appointment of 60 % of the people who elected him every fifth year. 
The government also tried to organise and control much of the rest of the society, like 
trying “to monopolise the representation of major interest groups, such as workers, 
students, peasants, women and religious congregations... The government both 
initiated the formation of new organisations and sponsored those already existing, 
providing them with official recognition and funding. In exchange the organisations 
were obliged to channel the government’s policies and political aspirations to their 
members, and to give electoral support to Golkar” (Eklöf 1999: 7). 
On March 10th 1998 Suharto was through this system reelected as the president for a 
seventh term. 72 days later he was forced to step down. 
 
1.4 The drafting process 
The drafting process of the new laws lasted only in eight months, from the end of 
May 1998 to the end of January 1999. Within this time, a govermental approved 
Team of seven had made their proposal to the existing Habibie-government. Also an 
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NGO-Consortium and The Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) had made their 
proposals. The proposals were discussed in parliament in late November 1998, before 
the final laws were adopted late January 1999. The general election was then held on 
June 7th 1999, and the final allocation of seats to the parliament was finished on 
September 1st. On October 20th 1999 the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the new President and Megawati Sukarnoputri as the 
new Vice President.
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2 THE NEW ELECTION LAWS
The electoral reform in Indonesia consists of three new laws governing elections, 
political parties and the structure of the legislative bodies (Law No 2, 3 and 4:1999). 
The laws were enacted on January 28th 1999 by the existing parliament, which had 
been elected in May 1997 under the rules of Suharto’s New Order. President B.J. 
Habibie signed these bills into law on February 1st, 1999. The laws regulate both the 
general election of the national parliament called the People’s Representative 
Assembly (DPR) and the elections of the two local levels which are the provincial 
assemblies (DPRD I) and the district assemlies (DPRD II). Some of the articles were 
very vague, and the general election commission (KPU) was set to carry out the 
policies of many of them after the election. 
 I will not discuss all the articles in the laws, but I will concentrate on the articles that 
have been most debated within the parliament and in the civil society outside the 
parliament. Furthtermore, I will concentrate on the articles regarding the election to 
the national parliament and to the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), and will 
therefore not elaborate on the articles and discussions regarding the elections to the 
provincial and district assemblies. 
2.1 The law on political parties 
Law number 2/1999 is regarding the political parties. It describes what kind of parties 
that may be able to register and contest the elections at the national level and the two 
local levels.  
 It says that in order to be allowed to contest any of the elections a party must have 
established party organisations in at least 9 out of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, and in at 
least half of the regencies or municipalities within those nine provinces.  
The paragraph from the 1984 law, requiring individual organisations to adopt 
Pancasila as their sole ideology, was eliminated. The new law allows political parties 
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to have religion as their founding ideology, although they must support the unity of 
the republic of Indonesia, Pancasila as the state ideology, and the 1945 Constitution. 
In addition, they must not be linked to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or 
other banned organisations. 
The new law represents a big change from the New Order-democracy which only 
recognised three political parties. It also opened up for traditional religious 
organisations to build political parties. 
2.2 The law on General Election 
Law number 3/1999 is regulating the general election. It prescribes the major 
guidelines for the seat allocation, and how the election shall be supervised and 
administrated. 
The electoral system became a hybrid between proportional representation and 
district system. It is called a proportional system with district characteristics. This 
means that every party has to list their candidates at the district level. But the votes 
were to be counted at the provincial level and the seats were allocated in a 
proportional manner, as it was in Suharto-era. The district characteristics are found in 
that the candidates who are going to represent the parties have to come from the 
district in the province were the party fared best. But the direct, district-system-like, 
accountability for each representative to his or her local constituency is not there, 
because the party-list system accompanies proportional representation.  It is said that 
the electoral system “was unique and was the clear product of political negotiation” 
(Hoosen 2003b: 158). I will discuss more on that negotiation later. 
 Further on the election law establishes an election commission (KPU). Article 
number 9 says that "Membership of KPU is composed of one representative from 
each political party participating in the election, and five governmental 
representatives" (Law no 3/1999, art 9, §1). But the voting rights from the 
governmental representatives and the representatives of the political parties shall be 
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balanced. Under Suharto, it was the government itself who was the organiser of the 
elections. 
The final allocation of seats for DPR, DPRD I and DPRD II based on the election 
result has to be made by KPU. This means that KPU is given a central role in 
specifying the general principles regarding the PR-system. 
The status of the Civil Servants was also changed. Under Suharto the Civil Servants 
were forced to vote for Golkar. Under the new rules they were free to elect any party, 
but they had to stay neutral and could therefore not become member of any political 
party. 
All Indonesian citizens aged 17 or married at the time of the election are eligible to 
vote. 
2.3 The law on structure and composition of MPR, DPR 
and DPRD 
This law prescribes the total number of seats in the parliament (DPR) and the 
people’s consultative assembly (MPR). 
According to the law, the parliament (DPR) shall consist of 462 elected members and 
38 appointed members from ABRI, and the total number of MPs will then be 500. 
The number of seats in MPR is reduced from 1000 in the previous laws under 
Suharto, to 700 according to the new law. MPR shall consist of the 500 members of 
parliament, in addition to 135 provincial representatives and 65 so-called "Society 
group representatives" – members of different social organisations who became 
members of MPR based on recommendation from KPU. The 135 provincial 
representatives are 5 elected representatives from each of the 27 provincial 
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assemblies2. KPU is given the role of pointing out the "society group 
representatives". 
Under Suharto the MPR consisted of 500 members from DPR and 500 members who 
were chosen from military, regional and functional group. The DPR on its side 
consisted of 425 elected members and 75 members from the military. 
The MPR will elect the president, but the law did not describe a clear rule for this 
election in the event that consensus is lacking. 
2.4 The theoretical framework 
There are two different kinds of theories that will help illuminating the research 
question. The first are theories on election laws and election systems, and among 
them Arend Lijphart’s theories on district systems and proportional representation in 
his book “Democracies - Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twenty-One Countries (1984), in addition to his theories and others on drafting of 
electoral laws. I will also in the later chapter discuss some of the aspects from 
Reynolds and Reillys “The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System 
Design” (1997). One of the focal points for the Indonesian debates on election laws 
was the discussion on election system between district and proportional 
representation. This has to do with the discussion on seat allocation, and the drafter of 
the new laws related their discussion to Lijphart’s theories and the background for his 
discussions. However, as we will see, there are several weeknesses in Lijphart’s 
theories that were illuminated in the Indonesian debate. This has to do with who the 
representatives are responsible towards, the party or their home constituencies. 
Therefore it is also useful to look on the theoretical basis of the International Insitute 
                                              
2 East-Timor held their referendum regarding independence from Indonesia or more autonomy within Indonesia at August 
30th 1999. The result showed a clear majority for independence. Therefore, DPRD I, the provincial parliament of the 
province of East-Timor was never settled after the election in June 1999. Hence, the number of elected representatives from 
the provinces in the MPR is 130 and not 135 since the provincial assembly of East-Timor did not choose their five 
representatives 
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for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). One of the critical factors when 
focusing on Lijphart and other theories inspired by rational choice-approach is that 
we have to assume rationality among the drafters and the ones who decided on new 
election laws. But as they were to decide on new elecion laws in a situation where 
none polls or other signs of the Indonesian people’s political preferences existed, it 
was almost impossible for the one who decided to calculate. Therefore we will see a 
vital discussion on election system, ended up with a compromise between district and 
proportional representation. 
Therefore I will also discuss theories on transition, among them contributions from 
Linz and Stepan’s “Problems of democratic Transition and Consolidation” (1996) 
and Atul Kohli (1993), as this is vital to illuminate what kind of actors that were 
involved in the transition phase. As we will see it is difficult to define what kind of 
transition the Indonesian was. But the theories on transition at least define a point of 
departure in an authoritarian state, and it gives us ideas on who is involved in the 
transition. 
2.5 The research question 
The aim for this thesis is trying to understand why the election laws in Indonesia 
were made in the way they were. There are many questions that we could have raised 
as underlying questions for this aim, among them are: Why did the Indonesian MP’s, 
when they had the chance of reforming the old institutions, decide to stay with a 
unitarian state in one of the worlds most heterogeneous societies? Why did they not 
decide on a pure system of proportional representation or pure district system? Why 
did they make it so difficult to establish own political parties for regionalised 
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opposition in for example Aceh or Irian Jaya3? Why is the military appointed 38 seats 
in the parliament?  
In order to provide an answer to these questions we have to take a closer look on the 
people, interest groups, parties and so on that were involved, or tried to involve in the 
process that led forward to the final decision in the end of January 1999. What were 
their priorities, who made alliances with whom? Who succeeded and why did they 
succeed? We will have to go into a discussion about what arguments a party used on 
the problem of PR-system versus of district system, and we will by that focus on 
exploring what group that dominated the process until the final decision-making. This 
will of course lead into an analysis of why one group for instance could favour 
district system, but that is not my main aim. The main aim leads us to uncover the 
research question for this thesis which is: 
 
What were the main propelling forces behind the election laws, and 
whose advice, if any, did the legislators of the laws follow in their 
decision-making? 
 
The question is based on the assumption that some parts of the elite probably have 
had more influence on the drafting process than others. The transitional period which 
we are discussing, is a period without a clear mandate from the «demos». Therefore 
one has to look for possible alliances between forces outside and inside the existing 
parliament. According to most theories on transitions, the regime has to make 
alliances with some parts of the opposition in civil society in order to carry out its 
policy. 
                                              
3 Aceh and Irian Jaya are two of the outer provinces in Indonesia where separatists have been fighting for independence for 
decades 
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In the case of Indonesia it seems like huge mass demonstrations based on a stronger 
civil society with the student movements in the forefront had the power to force 
Suharto from power. So, some parts of the opposition have definitely played a role in 
starting the process that led the country into a transitional period. But it was the New 
Order-parliament that made the final decision on the laws. Therefore we have to raise 
the question about how the Habibie-administration, the members of parliament and 
the main forces in the civil society outside the New Order-democracy related to each 
other in the drafting process of the new laws.  
The election laws themselves will in this thesis be viewed as being the final result of 
a process of electoral reform. I will therefore not go into a deeper analysis on what 
effects that the new laws may have had on the prospects of consolidating democracy 
in Indonesia. Nevertheless, there are several different reasons behind the variety of 
arguments which members of the parliament, members of the government, 
bureaucrats, governmental advisors, oppositional leaders, domestic and foreign 
academical and NGO experts on democratic transitions did bring into the debate. A 
narrow rationalistic approach at the micro-level will tend to state that everyone argues 
in order to secure his or her personal position by benefiting on the final decision. A 
more idealistic approach at the macro-level will suggest that one argues in order to 
reach some "higher" goals, which in this example could have been some of these: the 
establishment of a consolidated democracy; securing that Indonesia would continue 
to be a unitary state; avoiding balkanisation of the country; give the opportunity for 
everyone to establish parties and become represented in the parliament; and so forth. 
We will have to bear this in mind when analysing the different group’s positions on 
the dispute over the election laws. However, the election laws, as they were decided, 
have to be seen as the result of a debate among many propelling forces that were 
fighting for their own political future. Hence, we have to assume that the members of 
parliament knew how the different parts of the election laws would influence their 
chances of succeeding, and even beeing reelected. 
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2.5.1 Hypothesis 
A normal definition points that «hypothesis is an assertion about an empirical 
phenomena which one want to examine in a research in order to find out if it is true 
(Hellevik 1991: 37, my translation). Some basic hypothesis has been developed based 
on the research question in point 2.5 above in order to find out if they make sense. 
According to Karl Popper (in Føllesdal, Walløe and Elster 1990) one can never verify 
a phenomena, so the true and only meaning of scientific research is to falsify what is 
wrong and by that way, like pealing an onion, move closer to a thought verified core. 
In that respect, a positive answer to the arguments in the hypothesis below is not 
guaranteeing that it is true, but it will indicate that they at least are not falsified by the 
indicators that follow the hypothesis. Hence, a falsification of the following 
hypothesis will measure that it is incomplete in describing the actual phenomena. As 
a hypothesis needs an empirical foundation which is used for falsifying or 
establishing an approached confirmation of the hypothesis, we have to measure the 
terms in the hypothesis so that we can analyse their probability. 
 
The hypothesis is as follow: 
H1: The dominant group within the parliament would decide on an 
election law that would maximise its possibility of staying in position. 
 
Too many political analysts have made their conclusions on the drafting process 
based on the results in the general election that were held in June, and hence they 
would falsify H1 since Golkar gained fewer votes than expected. But it is not 
adequate to use the election results as a meter for H1, because the actors did not know 
how the people were going to vote when they established the election laws. In fact, 
most analysis made before February thought that Golkar would gain most votes in the 
following election (Jakarta Post: 1998 and 1999). And even more, the actors in the 
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drafting process were themselves acting and discussing on basis on the existing 
knowledge at that time, a knowledge that certainly did not include the election 
results. So, rationalising post-election is not logical valid. What measures do we then 
have for H1? We could look at the statements made by members of the dominant 
party. But it is not probable that we will find statements in the specific political 
environment that would support the hypothesis, and if we happen to find those 
statements we have to compare them with the actual voting. Therefore, we will have 
to use a different measurement, and in the case of H1, the election law theory is to be 
used. I will argue that the main theories on election laws (see chapter 3, below) says 
how a dominant party may gain most seats in the parliament. If the decided laws are 
not comparable with the theory we can falsify H1. 
In order of measuring the hypothesis we will have to look on this. I will argue that 
one of the factors that will maximise the dominant group within the parliament’s 
chances to stay in position is that they will have to vote for election laws that would 
exclude forces that will lead to a balcanisation of Indonesia. On the other hand the 
ruling regime will as theories on transitions indicates, also have to co-operate with 
other parties, NGOs and/or parts of the civil society outside parliament in order of 
reaching its goals. This is an extremely important task in a transition phase. Lastly, 
the precondition for a transition towards democracy is often that the relation between 
forces within the society is changing. Therefore, new alliances between major forces 
must have been build during the transitional phase in Indonesia, as this will 
contribute to the chances of the ruling regime to stay in position. 
2.5.2 The argument 
The period from Suharto stepped down in May 1998 until the final decision on the 
three laws covering the electoral reform is characterised by a more open public 
debate on political questions, including the reform process of the election laws, than 
the country had seen for many decades. On the surface it seemed as if opposition 
groups had got an immense increased influence on the domestic politic in Indonesia. 
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The newspapers were filled with critical comments on the role of the government. 
There were demonstrations in the streets in several cities on several islands. 
Organisations prepared for establishing there own political party. But the final 
decision on the new election laws was to be taken by a parliament elected in the 
Suharto-era in 1997. Hence, it was dominated by Suhartos own Golkar-party. 
I shall argue that the final design of the Indonesian election laws was the result of an 
internal split within the governing Golkar party. Golkar-members of parliament and 
Golkar-members of government could not agree. There were alliances between some 
parts of the opposition inside and outside the parliament with some parts of Golkar, 
and the alliances were changing from one subject to another according to the different 
policies the opposition had on the different subjects. I.e. there was no single united 
opposition as some parts of the opposition was happy when Suharto stepped down 
and became eager to maximise their chances of getting a political influence wihtin the 
new election system, while other parts of the opposition were left out in the cold and 
was eager to continue fighting against the old regime. 
The parliamentary debate on the election laws could have been expected to be an 
easy affair: Golkar, which had the majority of seats, should have been able to decide 
on whatever electoral system that best would suit itself and the chances of its 
representatives to be re-elected. Nevertheless, we have to remember that the drafting 
process happened in an era where the outside-parliament opposition had forced the 
old president to withdraw, so Golkar had to relate to forces in the civil society. An 
interesting thing is therefore that members of Golkar continuously made 
compromises with eachother, with representatives from other political parties, and 
with opposition outside the parliament unto the day of the final decisions in January 
1999. It is difficult, therefore, to describe Golkar as one single actor with only one 
agenda. Because of this it does make sense to go into a deeper analysis of what were 
the propelling forces behind the election laws. We know that a broad civil opposition 
based on NGO’s and students were active in demanding Suharto’s withdrawal as 
president through the demonstrations that took place during the spring of 1998. Still, 
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I will argue that the student movements were almost without influence in the 
discussion on the election laws. Hence I will argue that parts of Golkar made alliance 
with representatives from some of the larger NGO’s, and that this was the formula 
that resulted in the final decision in January 1999.  
A key argument is also that western based experts on election laws and transition to 
democracy, who tried to give advice’s to the people involved in the drafting process,  
were to a very little degree listened to. Their main arguments on what election system 
they thought would be suitable for the Indonesian society were to a very little degree 
taken into consideration in the Indonesian debate and in the final decisions on the 
new laws. But the people drafting the new laws related to western based theories, like 
Lijphart. By comparing theories on election laws with the actual process in Indonesia, 
we will demonstrate that western theories are not always suitable for societies in Asia 
that want to create their own stabile democracy, and show that there are several paths 
towards democracy. One possible reason for this is that most theories on election 
laws are empirical based on actual development of democracies in the western world, 
and are not thoroughly useful as a theoretical base for a process of building new 
democracies.  
 Nevertheless, we have to assume that if not everyone participating in the debate, so 
at least that the people involved in the central drafting comities as for instance the 
seven members of Tim Tujuh4, central politicians in the main parties and in the 
governmental departments, and some people in the opposition had certain knowledge 
on how election laws works.  
I will therefore state that the argumentation different political groups used for 
choosing for instance A instead of B or C varies a lot. It does not have to be rationale 
in the sense that they choose A because western based theories on election laws say 
that they then would gain more votes. They may have chosen A because of historical 
                                              
4 “Tim Tujuh” is Indonesian and means “Team of Seven” 
 27
reasons, or because of feelings. One may also have chosen A because one thought 
that this was the only alternative for obtaining a stabile and consolidated democracy 
in Indonesia. An analysis of these factors will contribute to the understanding of 
which forces that were propelling when new election laws were adopted in Indonesia. 
2.6 The structure of the thesis 
In the third chapter I will discuss some methodological considerations. The fourth 
chapter brings an overview of the events that took place during the period between 
Suharto stepped down and the time when the election laws were adopted. The 
viewpoint of different actors and advisers will also be discussed here. Thereafter, in 
chapter number five and six the theoretical framework will be discussed. In the last 
chapters the resul and the debate t will be analysed before I end up by adding some 
concluding remarks.
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3 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.1 Research design 
What methodological approach is this thesis based on? The basic sources for this 
research are not quantitative data. Therefore this study is a qualitative study. The 
units are single-persons, organisations, political parties and a government. The 
variables are innumerable, though concentrated on what we may call "attitudes to 
election laws". 
The main purpose for this study is to investigate what the propelling forces behind 
the adaptation of the Indonesian election laws adopted in January 1999 were. Hence, 
the explanandum in this thesis is "the propelling forces". Further, what is to be 
explained is "the different actors expressed attitude or viewpoint to the different 
paragraphs or variables in the election laws", and "the final adopted election laws" 
themselves. 
One research design, which has often been applied when the purpose is to describe and 
explore a contemporary phenomenon, is case study analysis. A case study is the best 
alternative for research design. According to Robert K. Yin, a single case study is an 
appropriate design when “the case represents an extreme or unique case” (1994:39).  
The study in this thesis is on the case of the election law reform. There are also 
several actors that have to be incorporated as units in this study.  According to Yin 
three conditions must be fulfilled when using case study. First of all, the research 
questions have to be characterised as "how-" or "why-questions". Second, the 
investigator cannot exercise control over the investigated events. Third, the focus has 
to be on contemporary as opposed to historical events. It does make sense to argue 
that our research can fulfil these criteria. Although the research question does not 
contain neither a "why" nor a "how" is the main characteristica contained in the 
underlying question about why the election laws were made in the way they were 
(see chapter 2.5 above). Furthermore, we do not have the possibility of exercising 
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control or manipulate the events. And finally, the research is on contemporary events, 
allthough the completion of this thesis have taken some time. So, our analyses fits the 
the criteria of a case study design. I will therefore argue that we use a comparative 
case study in this thesis, since we are comparing different actors or units. And 
according to Yin, «no broad distinction is made between the so-called classic (that is, 
single) case study and multiple-case studies» (ibid.: 52).  
3.2 Sources and collection of data 
Writing this thesis in Norway, one may not assume that the accessibility of sources is 
high. However, there are fortunate possibilities in this time of Information 
Technology to have access to a variety of qualitative data on the debates in Indonesia. 
Newspapers in Indonesia covered the debate, and they were themselves an arena for 
public debate by the articles that were written there. And thanks to the new-born 
freedom of speech in the Indonesian public life in general, and particularly in the 
press, the accessibility of adequate information about the political developments that 
previously under Suharto was dulled, has reached a sufficient level for writing this 
thesis. Due to the fact that the completion of this thesis has taken a while, analysis of 
the drafting process of the election laws have been finished by other, so that there are 
also sources and analysis available. 
This thesis is based on both primary and secondary data. The primary data includes 
the final versions of the election laws, voting results in MPR, proposals for the laws 
made by different actors, written statements in newspapers and magazines, and 
articles and books including theories on election laws and theories on transitions to 
democracy. By primary data we will also refer to interviews conducted by the author. 
The secondary data includes sources collected by other researchers and students, as 
well as comments on the drafting process given by people or institutions that were 
unable to intervene or influence in the actual Indonesian debate given the facts that 
they were conducted after the decisions on the laws were made. 
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3.3 Interviews as an information source 
Interviews are one of the primary data that have been used in this study. It would 
have been much more difficult to study the drafting process without having the 
possibility of travelling to Indonesia and interviewing some of the people involved in 
the process. Although the availability of data is surprisingly high (see 3.2 above) the 
aim of this study is to uncover some connections which have not been too 
transparent. In that respect the interviews represent a necessary and valuable 
information source, as much of the information collected through the interviews is 
not easily available in written material. 
The interviews were conducted during a five weeks stay in the Indonesian cities of 
Jakarta and Yogyakarta in August and September 1999. All of the informants except 
one, spoke English fluently, as well did the author of this thesis. Communication was 
therefore not a problem except for the single case where translation had to be 
conducted by a third person. The interview based on a translating third person is 
therefore strictly spoken only a secondary source. The interviews were not recorded 
on a tape, but I took brief notes by hand. When the interviews were finished the entire 
interviews were written on a computer.  
Yin draws a line between interviews of an open-ended nature, a focused interview 
and those that entail more structured questions (ibid.:84-85). The latter is similar to a 
formal survey. The focused interview is more conversational, and is structured 
around a set of questions. I have conducted focused interviews as a common 
interview-guide for all the interviews was written before travelling to Indonesia (see 
appendix). This guide consisted of fifteen open questions regarding the main research 
question and the final design of the election laws. It was not always enough time to 
go through all of the questions in the interviews, and the answers that the 
interviewees gave resulted often in unprepared follow-up questions. Even more, as an 
example there was of course no use of asking questions about inside parliament 
conditions to people working for an international NGO. So the questions were 
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adapted to the position of the person interviewed and the actual time-limit for each 
interview, and each interview had therefore to be prepared individually.  
The interviews started by a presentation of myself and my aim of conducting the 
study and selecting the informant. Then the questions were presented successively. 
Ten of the total number of fifteen interviews lasted for approximately one hour, only 
five interviews lasted for less than thirty minutes. All informants were eager to 
answer all general questions, but some of them were more reserved when it came to 
questions regarding there own standings and participation in the process. As the aim 
of the interviews was to be more explorative than provocative, the first questions 
were of a more general character while the last questions in some cases were on more 
tense issues. The reason for arranging the interviews in this way was that it is 
extremely important to build confidence with the informants as many of them daily 
are exposed to critical questions from journalists. It was therefore important to state 
that the aim of the interviews were of academically interests. It seemed as if the 
informants in most of the cases were satisfied with having the opportunity of giving 
more in-depth answers to the process that at that time already were passed by six 
months. 
In order of increasing the reliability (see 2.5 below) of the information given by the 
informants, the information given by the informants were cross-checked in two ways. 
First, other informants were asked to comment information given by another 
informant, and information collected has also if available been cross-checked with 
secondary literature. Second, an informant was asked several questions covering the 
same issue in order to minimise the possibility of misunderstanding.  
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3.4 The selection of informants 
Who were the persons that were interviewed, and why were they chosen?5 Professor 
Olle Törnquist, the supervisor of the author, who himself has been conducting 
research on Indonesian politics since the 1970s gave a list of names and 
recommendations on which persons that could be fruitful to contact. As the purpose 
of the interviews was to get a better knowledge of what happened in the drafting 
process of the Indonesian election laws, the aim was to make interviews with people 
involved in the process at different levels. Therefore, members of different political 
parties were interviewed. This included one member of each of the following parties: 
The governing Golkar, PPP (oppositional party allowed by the New Order-
democracy), PAN and PBB. It was also given priority to make interviews with 
members of the groups of experts that had been given proposals to the formation of 
the laws. Hence, interviews were arranged with two members of Tim Tujuh, one of 
the political scientists at LIPI, and two of the members of the NGO-consortium. 
Furthermore, two human rights lawyers who have been active in the public debates 
on Indonesian politics were interviewed. Finally, four Non-Indonesians who are 
experts on Indonesian politics, and in three of the cases also representing the three 
international organisations NDI, UNDP and International IDEA, were used as 
informants. In addition to those persons mentioned above, meeting with other 
Indonesians and expatriates, helped broaden the perspective on the Indonesian 
political life.  
Some of the informants were contacted by fax and/or e-mail before leaving Norway, 
and agreements were made to set up a detailed time-schedule when I arived 
Indonesia. Most of the informants were though not contacted before departing to 
Indonesia. Therefore the offices of most of the informants were contacted and 
appointments for interviews were made by a personal attendance. In a few cases one 
informant could give advice of interviewing another person who was unknown to the 
                                              
5 A complete list on the interviews is written in the references at the end of this thesis 
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author before arriving Indonesia. Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct 
interviews with all the persons who one hoped to meet, but nevertheless the list of 
persons interviewed includes more people central in the process than what one could 
expect to meet as a cand.polit degree student. There is of course still a risk that the 
person conducting the interviews may have got a too subjective and disproportional 
review of the process, as a possibility of interviewing for instance representatives 
from ABRI, central governmental representatives or finding a person representative 
for the students could have helped broaden the perspective, but given the limitation 
on time spent in Indonesia this was not possible. One therefore has to counterbalance 
the information given by the informants with other primary and secondary data in 
order of presenting an accurate description on the views of the different actors 
involved the process.  
Another issue that one has to be aware of is that it seemed as if none of the 
informants, directly involved in party politics or not, were trying to express an 
objective view on the political debate on election laws. This also includes the foreign 
experts. Every informant therefore clearly seemed to have their own agenda with 
what they presented. It is of course difficult to be impartial to political debates, the 
problem of not being able to be objective when describing political events is well-
known, but it is even more important to be aware of this when analysing the results of 
the interviews made in the tense political environment in Indonesia. What 
furthermore may reduce the reliability of the data collected through the interviews is 
the problem of guided selection. In some cases one informant gave advice on whom 
to contact for the next interview. There are two reasons why this happened: First, the 
limited time and knowledge of whome to contact made it easy to give priority to the 
advice’s given by an informant. Second, given the fact that one often has to use a 
reference person in order of getting access to informants, it was easy to contact 
people where one informant could be used as a reference when making the next 
appointments. Therefore, a way of trying to increase the reliability of the information 
given through the interviews is by referring to other data, primary or secondary. Data 
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supporting the statements given in the interviews will increase the reliability of the 
interviews as an information source. 
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4 THE DEBATE ON THE REFORM OF THE 
ELECTION LAWS 
What were the different actor’s positions in the debate on the election laws? In this 
chapter we will give a brief introduction to some of the different actor’s points of 
views and how they argued in the debate that took place until the new laws were 
adopted in the end of January 1999. It is important to focus on this simply because 
there normally is a close connection between the points of view in a debate and how 
the same person will vote when a final decision has to be made. The problem though, 
as we will see in this Indonesian case, is that the representatives in MPR who were 
the ones who were deciding on the law reform, were very silent throughout the public 
debate on the reform. On the other side, those who were most active intervening in 
the public discussions were therefore not necessarily in a position to decide on new 
laws.  
This disproportion between the group of people debating and the group of people 
deciding is one of the interesting features in this thesis. By focusing on an open 
public debate we are also focusing on a kind of debate that is a feature of a kind of 
political system that Indonesia at the time of the election law-debate was yet to enter 
into: Democracy. Hence we should be aware that not every politician or political 
interested person in Indonesia might have felt comfortable enough to take part in the 
public debate that took place in the sphere of the newly gained freedom of speech. 
Therefore, we have to assume that not everyone interested in the debate on the 
election laws knew, dared or were willing to take part in the discussion. 
It is of course impossible to cover all actors at all levels in the society, so we have to 
concentrate on some main actors. We will choose to focus on the main political 
forces that acted on the national scene, since we are mainly occupied with reform of 
the laws regulating the general elections. The appearances of international experts on 
democracies were significant in the Indonesian debate; hence we will also have to 
elaborate on their contributions. In addition to the public debate that took place in the 
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media on everything from smaller parts of the election reform to its totallity, we will 
also make a deeper analysis of the contribution that some academic, NGO-based and 
governmental groups brought into the drafting process. The coverage of the debate in 
media will because of my limited knowledge of the Indonesian language mostly 
include English-based sources. 
The following chapter will not give a chronological presentation of the drafting 
process, but will instead aim to discuss different actors’ contributions to the debate. 
4.1 Team of Seven 
President Suharto stepped down on May 21st 1998, and someone had started to think 
of political reform before he stepped down. One week before, on May 14th, Professor 
Ryaas Rasyid was asked by Hartono, Minister of internal affairs in Suharto’s 
government, to form a reform commision (Darusman 1999). From this we can 
conclude that it was not only Habibie’s own will that started the process of 
democratisation.  
According to Andi Mallarangeng, Rasyid then asked six other political scientists to 
join his technical team who became responsible for drafting the new election laws 
(Mallarangeng 1999). They were called Tim Tujuh (Team of Seven), and consisted of 
Rasyid, Mallarangeng, Afan Gaffar, Ramlan Surbakti, Hamid Awaluddin, 
Djohermansyah Djohan and Anas Urbaningrum. Four of them had graduated from 
Northern Illinois University. The new minister of home affairs in Habibie’s 
government, Syarwan Hamid, agreed on this group. Team of Seven gathered for the 
first meeting on May 29th.  
At first Team of Seven was given three months to draw a proposal for new election 
laws, but the parliament was in a hurry and asked them to complete a first draft after 
only two months. When they started their discussion, they “enjoyed free rein to draft 
the best electoral laws they could” (Hosen 2003a: 491). According to Andi 
Mallarangeng they had free discussions, but they knew that they were responsible to 
 37
the minister of Home Affairs (Mallarangeng 1999). The minister of home affairs 
were supporting them when they first met to discuss with him in July.  
Team of Seven send their draft to the Minister of Home Affairs at August 2nd and it 
stayed at his office without any official comments until September 16th. Then they 
got it back, discussed further, and presented their final draft in November 1998. 
 According to Mallarangeng (1999) they first drafted a true district system, but 
Golkar refused the district system at the first time. Mallarangeng told me that a lot of 
Golkar-members were afraid, because they are living in central areas (i.e. Jakarta) and 
were afraid to fight face to face with other representatives in the districts. This was 
also confirmed to me by another Team of Seven-member, Afan Gaffar (1999), who 
said that Golkar-members of parliament rejected the district system because non of 
them had a local level base as they had been appointed by the party elite. If district 
system had been chosen, they would have to spend time at the local level6.  
Team of Seven then had to rethink their proposal, and ended up with proposing a 
compromise between district and proportional (PR)-system. This hybrid was 
according to Andi Mallarangeng (1999) almost a German system, but it became a 
little more complicated when it was finally drafted in parliament. 
Further on Team of Seven suggested to separate MPR and DPR and to reduse the 
amount of members in MPR from 1000 to 700. On the other hand they suggested 
giving the military, ABRI, 55 seats in the parliament (DPR). In their first proposal 
this number was 50 seats (10% of the seats). On the other hand they proposed that the 
military was prohibited from managing a party. 
They also argued for free elections and in favour of a multiparty system, but Team of 
seven did not argue in favour of regional parties. Again, according to Mallarangeng 
                                              
6 This story is also confirmed in Nadirsyah Hosen’s (2003b) doctoral thesis where he has been interviewing the leader of 
Team of Seven, Professor Ryaas Rasyid, on the same issues. I did unfortunately not get the opportunity to meet with 
Rasyid when I made my field visit to Indonesia. 
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(1999), regional party was not seen as good for the nation and they were afraid of 
Balcanisation. Team of seven thought that introducing district system was a way to 
compromise on the issue of giving power to the regions. On the other hand they 
proposed that a party needed to have established party organisations in at least 9 out 
of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, and in at least half of the regencies or municipalities 
within those nine provinces in order of being allowed to contest the elections7. 
The situation for the Team of Seven was somewhat different from that of the other 
groups proposing their ideas for the election laws. The other groups, LIPI, NGO-
Consortium and so on, brought their idea into the public debates one time, and stayed 
with their proposal through the entire debate. Team of Seven was discussing with the 
Minister of Home Affairs, the Cabinet, President Habibie and others, and got new 
ideas or guidelines, and then returned to their work rethinking their proposal. Hence, 
Team of Sevens final proposal is a result of more than one group’s ideas. 
Mallarangeng told me that “it all started as an intellectual debate, and thereafter we 
had to compromise and become more pragmatical” (1999)8.  
4.2 LIPI 
The Indonesian institute of Science, LIPI, was asked by President Suharto as early as 
February 21st 1995 to analyse and give advice to him on what kind of electoral 
system that would suit Indonesia (LIPI 1998: ix). The fact that they were asked this 
early does not tell us that Suharto was ready to withdraw from authoritarianism at that 
                                              
7 Team of Seven first demanded that a party needed to have party organisations in 14 of the 27 provinces in Indonesia, but 
they redused this to 9 provinces. According to my interview with Andi Mallarangeng they redused it since they wanted to 
show some kind of accomodation to the new parties that had to establish themselves and register wihtin a very short 
amount of time. Sumatra has got 8 provinces and is the island with most provinces, hence a party therefore needs to have 
established party organisation in more than one island. This is therefore seen as a guarantee against regional based parties. 
8 Allthough Team of Seven started their work in May 1998, before most international organisations had started to give 
advices on an democratic reform in Indonesia there was one man who gave advices to Team of Seven. Kevin Evans, an 
Australian citizen working for United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) in Jakarta, was invited into the debate in 
Team of Seven in the beginning of July 1998. According to my interview with him (1999) he said that he was invited as 
Ryaas was trying to catch up people who were interesting in district system. UNDP got from July 1998 a role in giving 
technical assistance to both logistics and voter education through UNDP’s governance programme (UNDP 1999). 
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time, but it does tell us that even Suharto analysed if something had to be done wihtin 
the New Order democracy.  
LIPI evaluated the election system that had existed from 1971 to 1992, and discussed 
openly about the risk factors different election system could get. LIPI suggested 
changing the system gradually from proportional representation to district system. 
They thought that this should be done in three phases, as they argued that Indonesia 
was not ready to change system immediately. The three phases were as follows for 
the three elections to come (LIPI 1998: 31): 
 1997: Improved PR-system.  
2002: Transitional period with more district system. 50/50 district and PR-
system 
 2007: Perfected district system 
According to my interview with Mochtar Pabottingi who was central in LIPIs work, 
their proposal was never discussed in the parliament as it was a secret thing. They 
even did not get to know how Suharto reacted to their proposal (Pabottingi 1999). 
After Suharto withdrew in 1998, LIPI also took part in the public debate, and their 
proposal was printed (LIPI 1998).  
LIPI also argued that the representatives to the parliament should live in their district 
for at least one year before the election. And in the third phase, they proposed the 
military should not be represented in the parliament, but only in Peoples Consultative 
Assembly (MPR). This would mean that dwifungsi9 had to stop. 
                                              
9 Dwifungsi literally means two or dual functions. The doctrine says that ABRI, because of its historical role in the struggle 
for national independence have two roles. One is in defence and security, the other is in social and political management. 
Dwifungsi resulted in the situation where ABRI was represented in parliament and that they saw themselves as the 
guarantee for national stability and unity (Here from Eklöf  1999: 4) 
 40 
 
4.3 NGO-consortium 
There was also another group who drafted a complete proposal for new election laws. 
This was called the NGO-consortium and consisted of members from 22 different 
Indonesian human and legal rights organisations, both national Jakarta-based and 
local organisations, who by their own started to draft a proposal for election laws in 
order of presenting some input to the debate. The group was led by YLBHI, the 
Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, and they finalised their proposal in September 
1998 (Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional: 1998). According to my interview 
with Asmara Nababan (1999), the consortium gathered for the first time in 1997, 
when it was sign of decline of Suharto’s power. Nababan told that most of the NGOs 
in the consortium were surprised when Suharto withdrew from power in May 1998, 
and that there was no time to organise a big oposition. The consortium was working 
on highspeed as most of opposition outside the parliament was not too interested in 
the drafting process, as their main interest was to form politial parties and have new 
elections, so the NGO-consortium did not want to delay that process. 
The 22 organisations in the consortium dicussed for 10 days in August and 
September, thereafter they invited political parties to comment their draft. They also 
went to different provinces to get some input from outside Jakarta. According to my 
interview with Bambang Widjojanto, the director at YLBHI, a lot of the parties did 
not at all concern about the election law process (1999). They also went to the three 
political parties in parliament and to the military (ABRI), but only Golkar was at first 
interested in discussing their concept. After a while they challenged PPP, who was 
not preparing anything, and the consortium thereafter gave advices to PPP. 
The consortium proposed a combination of proportional and district system. One of 
their main agendas was that all members of DPR and MPR should be elected by the 
electorate. According to Widjojanto (1999) YLBHI would probably have been 
represented as a functional group, but they did not want to propose a system were 
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they could benefit from the functional group representation. The NGO-Consortium 
opposed that kind of a double representation. Therefore they also argued that 
dwifungsi should end.  
4.4 Department of Justice 
Allthough the Minister of Home Affairs had contacted Professor Ryaas Rasyid and 
asked him to draft the new laws, the Department of Justice made their own proposal. 
However, there are very few findings that their proposal was widely discussed. I will 
therefore, with one important exception, not elaborate more on their proposal here. 
The exception is that as long as their proposal was not widely disucussed, we can 
therefore conclude that the Department of Justice was not as a department among the 
propelling forces behind the new election laws. We can also conclude that when 
watching the table below, as we will find that their proposal in main issues was far 
away from the final result of the debate on the election laws. 
4.5 International inputs to the debate 
Most international actors were delayed in the sence that they did not react before the 
different proposals were handed over to the parliament; hence they were more 
occupied in advocating the election itself and did not put their focus on the drafting 
process. Nevertheless, there were some inputs to the debate on election laws. One of 
them was Kevin Evans from UNDP, who joined with Team of Seven in their 
discussions. Besides that, Ford Foundation also arranged a conference on the drafting 
process in Jakarta and National Democratic Institute (NDI) arranged an international 
conference on political reform together with University of Indonesia in July 1998. 
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Table 4.1  Comparison of proposals on main issues of the election laws 
 
Department/ 
Commitee 
System Election organizer Military (ABRI) and 
Civil Servant (PNS) 
Suharto’s new order 
laws 
Proportional LPU – government 
controlled 
75 ABRI in DPR, 425 
is elected. 500 in MPR 
were chosen from 
military, regional and 
functional group. PNS 
have to vote for 
Golkar.  
Team of Seven 
(Department of Home 
Affairs 
Combination of 
district and 
proportional 
Election Committee 
(Government 
Representatives, 
Parties and People) 
55 ABRI in DPR. 
PNS/ABRi is 
prohibited from 
managing a party 
Department of Justice District LPU (same as the old 
law) 
ABRI and PNS do not 
vote and elect 
LIPI Improved proportional Independent Election 
Organiser Secretariat 
Anyone from ABRI 
and PNS who want to 
enter the DPR/MPR 
must resign. ABRI 
represented by 54 in 
MPR 
NGO Consortium Combination of 
district and 
proportional 
Autonomy and 
independence with 
facilities provided by 
the government 
All members of DPR 
and MPR are elected 
through general 
elections 
The final laws Hybrid between 
district and 
proportional 
Election Committee, 
KPU,(Government 
Representatives, 
Parties and People) 
38 ABRI seats in DPR 
out of 500. The others 
are elected by the 
electorate. 65 
functional group 
representatives in 
MPR and 135 elected 
from the provincial 
parliament (DPR I). 
 
Source: Adnan Buyung Nasution has in “Some Notes on the Electoral Reform in Indonesia”, in 
Liddle (ed.) (2002), Crafting Indonesian Democracy, Bandung: Mizan, pp 135, made the 
framework for this table, but Nasution did not include the old laws and the final new laws in 
his table 
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Most international contributers to the debate, if they entered the debate before the 
drafts were presented to the MPR, or after, were proposing idealtypes of democracies, 
as learned from theories on election systems. Hence, most of them would for instance 
recommend that the military should not have any given seats in parliament, that an 
independent election comittee should be established, and that one should choose a 
clear and understandable election system which means either a clearcut proportional 
or district system. 
However, as most international contributers entered the debate too late, and as we can 
see were little debated, we will leave their positions with little attention for our 
further discussions, except for some few comments. As the Asian Crisis came to 
Indonesia, IMF was instrumental on a macro-level to the fall of Suharto when they 
demanded economic reform. And President Bill Clinton and The US State 
Department urged Habibie in May 1998 to “set a firm date for elections” (Hosen 
2003b: 134).  
Hence we can from these two examples at least conclude that international actors 
were instrumental for the transition towards democratic elections in Indonesia, but we 
can find little evidence that they played a key role in defining the content of the 
election system. 
4.6 The debate in media 
One of the first things Habibie did as a president was to immediately free the press 
and the party system by stating that his government would not ban publications or 
prohibit the formation of new parties as Suharto had done. 
This of course led to a more intensive debate in the media than what had happend 
during Suharto’s time. On the other hand it led to a situation where a lot of new 
political parties were founded, all though not all of them were, as we will see later on, 
allowed to contest the election. I will argue that the new openess came as a literally 
shock to the Indonesian people. Therefore did not everyone use their possibility to 
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tell their points of views to the Indonesian people. As late as in 1994, three national 
publications, Tempo, Editor and Detik were banned because the government thought 
they threatened the national security. We might therefore think that there was fear 
among some of the opposition groups that this could happen again during the 
Habibie-presidency. 
Nevertheless, the debate in media on the political development was more extensive 
than anytime during the previous decades.  This gave two major results. Firstly, it 
gave a huge amount of written and public sources that gave the opposition the 
possibility of reading, listening and taking part of the debate. It gave the people of 
Indonesia a better option to understand and follow the political life as it is. It also 
gave a well of sources for those who want to study the transition. Secondly, the new 
openness also led to a new situation where not only opposition was discussing, but 
where also members of parliament and the government had to take part in public 
debates to retain their positions. 
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5 THEORIES ON ELECTION LAWS 
The world has seen a lot of democracies appearing for the last decades. The 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) which were implemented by the World 
Bank in a lot of the poorest countries from 1986 onwards, formed the start of what 
Samuel P. Huntington has called the «third wave of democratisation» (1991).  The 
downfall of the communism in Eastern Europe strengthened this wave further, and 
today more than half of the population in the world lives in what we would like to 
call democracies. However, the new-born democracies require a set of rules which 
define how the election is going to be arranged, what kind of parties that are allowed 
to contest the election, how the number of votes is going to be translated into seats in 
the parliament and so forth. These rules are the election laws.  
The election laws differ from one regime to another. Even the authoritarian states that 
have so-called one-party democracies have their own set of election laws. Indonesia 
too, had election laws during Suharto's New Order democracy. It is obvious that the 
different ways the election laws are defined in various countries makes a great impact 
on at least the party structure and the allocation of seats in the parliaments.  
There have been written many articles and books on the different political 
consequences of different election laws. Theories on election laws often prescribe 
that a different set of laws are more suitable to one state than another, and hence X1 
should become chosen instead of X2 in order to have a better possibility of 
consolidating the democracy. We have to take for granted that those who were 
responsible for the drafting of election laws in Indonesia at least had some notion on 
the existing literature on this field of research. Therefore is it important to analyse 
and discuss some of the most important theories on election systems, in order to be 
able to make a deeper analysis of the drafting process that took place in Indonesia. 
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Because of the overwhelmingly amount of literature, theories, which do not relate to 
anything in the actual Indonesian debate will not be discussed here10.  
At the same time it is necessary in this thesis to have a discussion not only on the 
election laws itself, but also on theories on transition to democracy. There are a lot of 
theories that have evolved on transitions side by side with the enormous wave of 
democratisation the world has seen the last decades. Some of these theories are 
concentrating on the possibilities for creating a stabile consolidated democracy, while 
other are more dealing with the building of different alliances within the transitional 
period. I will in the next chapter take a closer look on some of the theories that are 
concentrating on the building of alliances, since this hopefully can give some 
valuable inputs to the question of understanding which forces that were most 
powerful in the drafting process of the new election laws in Indonesia. 
5.1 Election laws - a definition 
Are election laws and electoral laws identical? One of the findings while reading 
literature on this field is that there seem to be confusion on the meaning of the terms 
as they are often used side by side as if they had the same interpretation. One could of 
course in a thesis like this continue this confusion by allowing both terms to become 
used as the same term. However, I will try to make a distinct definition of "election 
laws" before we enter the field of discussing different political consequences of these 
laws. 
Douglas W. Rae makes a distinction between election laws on one side and electoral 
laws on the other side. According to Rae "electoral laws are those which govern the 
processes by which electoral preferences are articulated as votes and by which these 
votes are translated into distributions of governmental authority .... among the 
competing political parties" (Rae 1971: 14). With "governmental authority", we 
                                              
10 Theories on Singel Transferabel Vote and so forth 
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would normally think of parliamentary seats. Richard S. Katz argue that this 
definition only is satisfactory if we assume that the parties are totally cohesive and in 
total internal agreement, so that their candidates are interchangeable and do not turn 
over to another party (Katz 1986). Rae defines on the other side election laws as a 
broader class of laws which pertain to the conduct of elections (Rae 1971: 13-14). 
Election laws therefore seem to be more a common term for all the laws that have 
anything to do with the election.  
In my opinion one can therefore argue that the election laws normally give answers to 
four questions that also were central in the Indonesian debate: 
 1. Who has the right to vote? 
2. How are the votes going to be translated into governmental authority/seats 
in parliament? 
3. Who is eligible to contest the elections? 
4. What is the power of the elected individuals and the institutions they are 
going to represent? 
One will see that these four questions can cover presidential and parliamental 
elections, and both general/national and local elections. I will use these four questions 
as a guide for my further discussions on the discussion on the laws in Indonesia. It is 
nevertheless important to state that these questions are only guiding for the course of 
the analysis, hence they are not to be seen as research question by their own. 
5.2 Who has got the right to vote? 
One of the issues that the election laws have to prescribe is a definition of what kind 
of criteria that is necessary in order to become a part of the electorate. This is one of 
the themes that have been widely discussed during the centuries of the long transition 
to democracy within the European context. We know from the polis-states in the 
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antique Greece that only a small minority of the men were defined as citizens who 
got the right to vote. The right to vote was for centuries a right reserved for men in 
the European democratic history. This distinction by sex led to the formation of the 
early feminist-movement in some countries during the late 19th century. The right to 
vote has in some countries been reserved for people from certain ethnic groups or 
colour of skin like in The Republic of South Africa at the time of the apartheid-
regime. One of the criteria’s that historically has been used in many countries is that 
only those people who own land or have a certain income can be given the right to 
vote. This has among other things led to a strong noble class in some of the nations 
that have been consolidated for a long time like Great Britain. The foundation for the 
labour movement in many European countries has been built on the labour fight for 
influence and right to vote. According to the work of Stein Rokkan, every expansion 
of the right to vote in the European nations have given the birth of a new kind of 
parties (Rokkan 1987). 
All of these historically strong conflicts are normally pre-solved and therefore no 
subject for discussion when election laws have to be revised in connection with 
transitions to democracy nowadays. The freedoms of speech and right to vote are 
officially recognised as basic universal rights in most countries.  
In the case of Indonesia, there was a discussion regarding the sivil servants and their 
rights to vote for any party, as they under Suharto were forced to select Golkar. 
Under the new laws they were given the freedom to vote for any party. The fact that 
this issue was discussed in the debate in Indonesia, gives us an idea of what kind of 
authoritarian regime that existed under Suharto. On the other hand it seemed at last to 
have been a common understanding that everyone, including the sivil servants, 
should have their freedom to vote for any party in Indonesia. This represents a new 
openness, and less governmental control, and it may therefore be a sign that Golkar 
opened up, or that Golkar was forced to give up control. 
Even though every adult person normally on equal basis is given the right to vote, 
there are still a lot of disagreements on how one shall count the votes and translate 
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them into seats in the parliament. This may be an arena for governmental 
manipulation of the will of the people.  
5.3 How are the votes going to be translated into seats in 
the parliament? 
What happens to a vote after an elector has made his decision and voted in the 
election? Even if all people above a certain age have got the same right to vote will it 
not be sure that their vote will count for the same when the total number of votes is 
translated into seats in the parliament. The slogan "one man, one vote" does not 
necessarily lead to a new slogan "1000 votes, one M.P". It might very well happen 
that there is a structural inequality that makes one vote become more important than 
another, so that in one district 1000 votes will be enough for one seat in the 
parliament, while 2000 votes is necessary in the neighbour district. What are the 
arguments that can make such an inequality out of the equal right to express oneself 
possible?  
One of the main themes in the drafting processes of new election laws in Indonesia 
was the discussion on how one shall translate the number of votes into seats in the 
parliament. There are several systems, but most of them can according to Lijphard be 
put into two main groups (Lijphart 1984). The first one will here be called a district 
system and the second one will be called a proportional system. The different systems 
may have an impact on the total number of parties that normally can play a 
significant role in the elections. Lijphart’s theories were central in Indonesia, and in 
one debate between Mallarangeng from Team of Seven and Pabottingi from LIPI we 
can see how the understanding of the system described by Lijphart was different 
between them: 
Pabotinggi defended the "proportional" electoral system, which had been used 
in Indonesia for decades up to and including last years' elections. Under it, 
voters choose parties, not people, to represent them. Meanwhile Mallarangeng 
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sang the praises of the district system, in which voters get to choose who 
represents their area. The proportional system had long been misused by the 
past Suharto administration to lock down politics. Only three parties were 
allowed to compete, and one -- former ruling party Golkar -- was so well-
funded and well-supported that polls were basically one-party contests.  
 
Mallarangeng argued that under a district system, people would know their 
representatives, who would in turn have to be both accountable and responsive 
to their constituents. This was something sorely lacking even in today's 
parliament, where MPs are still picked by parties, so many provinces and 
districts are often represented by strangers from Jakarta. Pabotinggi held that 
the proportional system was an adequate check on popular ignorance, and 
worked well for a country as diverse as Indonesia. Mallarangeng told 
Pabotinggi to update his theories. Pabotinggi shot back by reading a sentence 
from a political science tract -- something along the lines that district systems 
work best in homogenous societies. "That book must be from the 50s!" scoffed 
Mallarangeng. ("1984," Pabotinggi retorted.) (Asiaweek 2000: 19) 
 
One of the things the theories say is that different compositions of the population 
could, as Pabottingi said, suit one system better than another system. I will here 
discuss various aspects of the two systems as it was discussed in Indonesia. 
5.3.1 The district- or majority system 
The district system is based on the British model and is also called the majority 
system. This electoral system has its main feature in the single-member district 
plurality or majority system. Simply spoken this means that the area where there are 
an election is divided into several smaller districts from which only one single person 
is going to represent each district. This means that in order to represent a district, one 
must get a majority of the votes within that district. Some nations require a simple 
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majority and other an absolute majority. If an absolute majority is required there 
normally has to be conducted a run-off second ballot between the top two candidates 
if no-one has got a majority off the votes after the first round. The district system will 
therefore produce only one winner from each district and leaves the minority 
unrepresented no matter how big it is. This will furthermore tend to let the party who 
gains most votes nation-wide become overrepresented in terms of parliamentary 
seats.  
One of the arguments for using the majority system is that it provides a clear cut 
choice for voters and is simple to understand. Furthermore, it transfers more power 
from the party organisation and towards the electorate. The party organisation will 
get less power to choose which people that are going to represent the party in the 
parliament because the electorate in each district has got the possibility of sanctioning 
the candidate that is to represent their district. A top candidate for a political party 
will therefore not be sure to be elected, and she has to compete with other candidates 
at the local arena from which only one person is to be elected (Reynolds and Reilly 
1997: 28f). This may further lead to a more person-oriented election campaign at the 
district level, where the electorate will face the candidates more than political parties 
are fighting each other for the single parliamentary seat in the district. This was also 
the argument used by Mallarangeng and Team of Seven. District system would move 
the power away from Jakarta. 
What consequences will follow from the majority system? Lijphart bases his theory 
on the main hypotheses that is referred to as Duverger’s Law, based on the theory 
that Maurice Duverger formulated in his book «Political Parties». His hypothesis is as 
follow (1959: 217): 
The simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system. 
Off all the hypothesis that have been defined in this book, this 
approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law. An 
almost complete correlation is observable between the simple-majority 
single-ballot system and the two-party system………. The exceptions 
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are very rare and can generally be explained as the result of special 
conditions. 
Although Duverger quoted that national factors also are very considerable and can 
make some variations from his hypothesis, do most theories after this seem to 
incorporate his law as a weberian ideal type without much discussion. There seem to 
be a tendency to accept that the district system will produce a dualism when it comes 
to party formation. Duverger’s hypothesis seems by far to be right when it comes to 
Great Britain and the US where respectively Labour and the Conservatives, and the 
Democrats and the Republican Party are playing the dominant role in those two 
countries parliamentary politics. And in the handbook of electoral system design 
published by the IDEA, the international institute for democracy and electoral 
assistance, it is also a clear guidance to new democracies that a majoritarian or “first 
past the post”-system will lead towards a competition between two major parties 
(Reynolds and Reilly 1997: 28f). But it is very difficult to argue that the same system 
is accurate in the case of India, where more than a dozen parties have got seats in the 
People's Assembly. One of the problems with Lijphart’s theories is that he excluded 
India from his analysis, probably because it did not fit into his theory, allthough 
Lijphart used different arguments for doing so (Lijphart 1984).  
So there is none direct implication that district system will produce a two-party 
system and that it therefore could have been the best for Golkar, who was the only 
party that had a strong party organisation represented in all districts of Indonesia. 
Does this mean that we can falsify Duverger’s Law totally, or is it more indicating 
that we should search for some special conditions or variables which may influence 
the district system to produce other party systems than indicated by Duverger? We do 
not necessarily have to falsify his law totally, although we by strictly methodological 
terms have to, but we may produce a better result if we reformulate his hypothesis. If 
we suggest that the most important factor in terms of party formation is that the 
simple-majority single-ballot system tends to produce two dominant parties in each 
single district, we will maybe have a better hypothesis. We may also have to put an 
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important note on the relation between the variables. Duverger's Law suggests only a 
one-way causation where the simple-majority single-ballot system is causing a two-
party system. We might ask if this is the only possible causal influence, or may we 
also make a change so that the dependent variable becomes the independent one and 
vice versa? What if we also suggest that the two-party system may favour a simple-
majority single-ballot system? Does it in some cases make sense to say that the 
number of parties can make an impact on which system of seat allocation there will 
be in a nation or state? If we look on the history of the democratic development in 
Europe we will clearly see signs of such a causal relationship. There was for example 
a district system for a long time in Norway with only two parties. When a third party, 
the Labour Party, gained more votes during the first decades of the 20th century and 
became a threat for the two traditional strongest parties, the two parties decided to 
change to a proportional system in order to secure that they would still be represented 
in the parliament (Furre 1992). It is important to notice that there can be another 
causal relation than what we find in Duverger's law, because in the case of Indonesia 
there were existing parties who decided on the election laws during the process from 
May 1998 until January 1999. And those Indonesian parties could possibly have their 
own agenda regarding the decision on election system. The three legal parties were 
all represented in the parliament through a proportional representation system, 
although one of them, Golkar, had a clear majority. When we go into the debate in 
Indonesia, it seems that the actors of Golkar knew the consequences of Duverger’s 
law. They feared that Golkar could loose more votes in an open multiparty election, 
so that they could get fewer seats in parliament than with a combination between PR 
and district system. Their fear of loosing the battle towards new oppositional parties 
in a district system seems to have been built on their knowledge of seat allocation in a 
pure district system. Besides that they feared what Reynolds and Reilly says that 
would happen if they, who had been living in Jakarta, would have to compete with 
other candidates at the local arena from which only one person is to be elected 
(Reynolds and Reilly 1997: 28f). 
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If we turn back to the main feature of Duverger's law, we can observe that many will 
argue that the majority system should mainly become used in ethnic and religious 
homogenous societies. Stein Rokkan, among others, has argued that the district 
system, because of its presumable tendency of producing two-party systems, will not 
fit societies with more than one structural political cleavage (Rokkan 1987). Ethnic 
and religious heterogeneous societies will often have at least two main political 
cleavages, one ethnic or religious in addition to one economic cleavage, and they 
therefore need more than two parties in order to let the different political attitudes be 
represented11. Indonesia is extremely heterogeneous when it comes to ethnicity and 
religion, and should therefore in order to let the minorities become represented 
probably benefit from having a system of proportional representation. When Team of 
Seven focus on a pure district system, it is therefore a sign that they were not to 
occupied with letting all minorities becoming represented, and that it for them seem 
to have been more vital to exclude the minorities. And as neither Habibie nor the 
majority deciding in parliament did argue for a pure proportional system, as it had 
been under Suharto, it is clear to see that they feared a system where to many 
minorities were represented in parliament. 
5.3.2 The proportional representation. 
"The basic aim of proportional representation is to represent both majorities 
and minorities and, instead of overrepresententing or underrepresententing 
any parties, to translate votes into seats proportionally" (Lijphart 1984: 150). 
Proportional representation (PR) is mainly a system where the total number of votes 
is translated into seats based on a formula which ideally let every seat in the 
parliament represent the same number of votes. There is however few countries 
where one divide the number of votes on seats in parliament. The Netherlands is one 
                                              
11 One example that illustrates this is the autonomous archipelago called Faeroe Islands, officially a part of Denmark, where 
there are two major political cleavages (economic right versus economic left, and pro-union versus pro-independence) 
which thus result in four political parties: socialist unionist party, socialist independence party, conservative unionist party 
and conservative independence party 
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example of a regime where one strives for this though, and where the votes are 
divided in one single nation-wide constituency that totally gains the 150 seats in the 
parliament. Nevertheless, "all electoral systems achieve considerably less 
proportionality than what is mathematically possible" (Lijphart 1984: 161). A PR-
system will under normal conditions give better possibilities for representatives from 
the minorities to become represented in parliament, than what is the situation with 
district system. 
There are several ways in which the PR-system is made more disproportional than a 
mathematical calculation would count for. Many of the countries with PR have 
included a formula in which the votes are divided into. This formulas may vary a lot, 
but the main aim for them is to give a slightly support for the biggest parties at the 
expense of the smaller ones.  
Nevertheless a PR-system was not proposed in Indonesia. I will therefore argue that 
the propelling forces behind the election laws thought that they would not benefit 
from PR-system when it comes to seat allocation.  
One aspect of PR-system, electoral thresholds, is sometimes used to a make it more 
difficult for smaller parties to be represented in the parliaments. In regimes that have 
supplementary seats and nation-wide districts, it has become easy for even very small 
parties to be represented, and electoral thresholds are therefore sometimes introduced 
to make it more difficult for smaller parties to get representation. The reason for this 
is often said to be that one wish not to have to many parties within the parliament, 
because this will make it more difficult to form strong governments and oppositional 
coalitions. For instance in Germany, where the threshold is 5 %, the system origins 
from the desire to limit the election of extremist groups (Reynolds and Reilly 1997: 
88). In Indonesia there was proposed a different kind of Electoral threshold: Only 
parties that was represented in parliament in the 1999 election could be allowed to 
contest the next general election. This was said to have been proposed in order of not 
having to many parties in parliament and making the people confused, but in reality it 
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is also a way where the dominant NGO’s and political parties could secure their 
future. 
5.4 Who is eligible to contest the elections? 
When we have agreed on the criteria for becoming an elector and how the votes are 
going to be translated into seats in the parliament, we still do not know whom we are 
going to elect. Should everyone be able to join a political party and be one of their 
candidates competing for getting a seat in the parliament? And furthermore, should 
every political group be allowed to found a political party and contest the elections?  
These questions are often important issues in the transition phase between an 
authoritarian and a democratic regime, and it is also quite often an important issue in 
the fight for political rights within democracies. The ruling elite’s have in some cases 
a tendency to discriminate the opposition by not letting them be able to contest the 
election, or to control it by allowing only some parts of the opposition to contest the 
election. In Suharto's New Order Regime only three parties were allowed to contest 
the election, and the rules on how to translate votes into parliamentary seats secured 
Suharto's own Golkar Party the majority within the parliament. 
There is no single theory that explains the different consequences of the existing rules 
or which system that is preferable when it comes to the question of making rules for 
what factors that are or should be required in order to organise a political party and 
letting it contest the election. Nevertheless there is a tendency to argue that it would 
be preferable for the stability of a regime if opposition groups are allowed to form 
political parties and contest the election (Linz and Stepan 1996). At the same time 
civil right groups argue that also parties not represented in the parliament should be 
able to contest the next election even if they failed to be represented in the current 
one. Nevertheless, in Indonesia one special party was excluded from participation, 
also in the new proposed laws. Due to historical reason from the 1960’s, Team of 
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Seven would not propose that a Communist Party could contest the election, hence 
the communists were excluded. 
5.5 What is the power of the elected 
The last question the election laws should bring an answer to is the above raised 
question about what the power of the elected is, and how their power relates to the 
power of other institution and the electorate. This question will necessarily become 
answered in a different way if we are talking about a parliamentary election than if 
we were talking about a presidential election, since a president has a different power 
than an MP. Furthermore, this topic raises some fundamental constitutional questions 
covering the heritage from Montesquieu regarding the separation of powers, the 
connection between them, and the different roles of the judicial, executive and 
legislative institutions12.  
Montesquieu argued that a distinguished separation between the three institutions is 
necessary to create liberty (Montesquieu 1748, here from Held 1987). Montesquieu's 
analysis, however, was not fully coherent, as a definition of the exact powers of the 
legislature and executive, and the interdependency between them were left quite 
ambiguous. He did not even think that the legislators should be made accountable to 
the electorate (Held 1987). In many ways Montesquieu's thoughts only paved the way 
for what has become a common notion in more modern theories on democracy and in 
the practical experiences of most democracies. That is that the representatives in the 
parliament are accountable to the electorate, and that the electorate at least in each 
general election has the possibility of sanctioning its representatives. Furthermore, 
most democracies tend to have a clear notion on how the interdependency between 
the different institutions is, although this not has to be written in the constitution, if 
and when a constitution does exist. As an example we know that in the parliamentary 
                                              
12 I will not elaborate on the role of the judiciary since this, in most cases, is not an elected body, and therefore not covered 
by the election laws 
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system in Norway the executive institution has been accountable to the legislative 
institution since 1884. Nevertheless, this was not written in the constitution before 
2007, over a century after it had become a constitutional practice.  
Much of this debate was left out from the Indonesian debate. The new election laws 
did not give any rule on for instance on how the MPR should elect the president. And 
furthermore, by proposing that the military should still have given seats in 
parliament, Team of Seven contributed to a situation where one of the main forces in 
society was secured a place amonge the legislators, giving laws and money to 
themselves. 
5.5.1 Unitary versus federal state 
One distinction that is relevant to the question of what the power of the elected is, and 
to the case of Indonesia, is the distinction between a unitary and a federal state. There 
is a tendency of recommending that states with a vast heterogeneous society will have 
an increased chance of getting a consolidated democracy with an internal stability. 
On the other hand, homogenous states could be better of striving for a unitary state, 
instead of having an expensive and immense organisation of the state. However, this 
was never, due to historical reasons, discussed in Indonesia, as this had been tried and 
failed in the 1950’s. This is discussed further among other places in Tønnesson and 
Antlöv (2001). 
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6 SHIFTING ALLIANCES IN A PHASE OF 
TRANSITION 
In May 1998 the position of Suharto in Indonesia changed radically. After having 
been the strong man in the alliance with the military for 32 years, he overnight 
became a weaker man. General Wiranto, the head of the military forces (ABRI), gave 
Suharto the advice that he should withdraw after weeks of demonstrations against the 
president.  Suharto followed Wiranto’s advice, and at that time it was made clear to 
everyone that Suharto was not the strong man of Indonesia anymore. This does not 
mean that we can conclude that neither the new president Habibie nor General 
Wiranto became a new strong-man, it is not certain that anyone became new strong-
man at all. The opposition in the streets was after all stronger than any other time 
during Suharto’s presidency. At the same time as Suharto withdraw, the process of 
establishing a new framework for a multi-party democracy started through the reform 
of the election laws. And a key question to this transition is: Who made alliances with 
whom in this process?  
In order of being able to answer that question, I will in this chapter discuss the 
standings of some of the theoretical sources on transition in general, and alliance-
building-processes in a transitional phase in special, that can contribute to an 
illumination of the propelling forces behind the Indonesian election laws. 
Unfortunately, most theories on transition seem to be occupied with questions related 
to the structural part regarding what kind of pre-democratic regime that gives the best 
possibility of leading into a consolidated democracy. Hence, the theories will not pay 
to much attention to the different individual actors in the political game who are 
playing within the transition-phase itself. The debate over new election laws that we 
have in this thesis will therefore be discussed more on structural basis, and not so 
much on the thinking of each individuals. We will here start out by exploring and 
discussing the theories that are most relevant to our project, and which will guide us 
towards an arena where we will find adequate information for the purpose of 
investigating the propelling forces behind the Indonesian election laws. 
 60 
6.1 Some definitions 
6.1.1 What is a transition? 
Before we enter into a discussion over the different theoretical contributions, we have 
to make some small comments on transitions in general. The basic assumption of 
"transition» is that it is a transformation from one type of a regime to another type of 
a regime (Linz and Stepan 1996). Hence, a shift from a democratic regime towards a 
totalitarian regime will also be named as a transition. It is therefore no necessity that a 
transition will lead to a democracy, in fact Linz and Stepan argued that most 
transitions «from a once-stable non-democratic regime do not end in «completed 
democratic transitions»» (Linz and Stepan 1996: xiii). Therefore, almost needless to 
say, the word «transition» does not tell us anything about a direction; the only thing it 
says is that there has been a structural change in the governing regime. It is structural 
because it involves a structural change in the inter-relation between the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary, or between the state power and the civil society. A 
structural change therefore involves more than a normal succession from one 
president to another one. This implies that it is possible to have a transition where a 
nation will have the same ruling party, president or prime minister before, through 
and after the transition.  
We are in this thesis focusing on the special way of transition that is called a 
democratic transition, because we recognise the implementation of the election laws 
and the following Indonesian election in 1999 as being a step in a democratic reform. 
There are several definitions of the term «democratic transition». Linz and Stepan 
(1996: 3) have a rather extensive definition reflecting that a democratic transition is 
completed when the new "government de facto has the authority to generate new 
policies". They hope that they with that definition can help guard against the 
"electoralist fallacy" which define free elections as not necessary, but sufficient for 
democracy. As long as this thesis is focusing on the drafting of the election laws, we 
will here jump into this "electoralist fallacy" by defining the establishment of "free 
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and fair elections" as sufficient for a democratic transition. We will therefore have to 
leave all discussions about the possibilities of creating a consolidated democracy for 
now and instead focus on the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy 
with free and fair elections. This does not mean that discussions about necessary and 
sufficient criteria for a successful consolidation of a democracy are of no interest in 
this thesis, but due to the focus on the drafting of the election laws it will be 
necessary first and foremost to elaborate on the first step, which was to hold free and 
fair multiparty elections in Indonesia. 
6.1.2 What regime type can Suharto's Indonesia be defined as? 
Before starting to analyse how the different theoretical approaches can illuminate the 
Indonesian transition, we have to make sure that Suharto's New Order regime can be 
classified as an authoritarian regime. There are many definition of "authoritarian state 
power". Michael Mann defines it as a combination of high infrastructural- and high 
despotic power, a characterisation that may fit well into the Indonesian situation 
during the time of the New Order (Mann 1993: 60). Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 
have divided the non-democratic regimes into four different regime types: sultanistic, 
totalitarian, post-totalitarian and authoritarian13. Without falling into a too big 
discussion of the different features that charactherise all of the different regimes, we 
will hereby briefly present their definition of an authoritarian regime, and state why 
Indonesia fit into an authoritarian regime type. Linz and Stepan argue that there are 
"four distinctive dimensions of an authoritarian regime⎯limited pluralism, mentality, 
somewhat constrained leadership, and weak mobilization" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 
39). The distinct difference from the two types of totalitarian regimes and a sultanistic 
regime lies in the fact that totalitarian regimes do not have any economic or political 
                                              
13 Linz and Stepan define four different types of non-democratic regimes in their book «Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation» (1996): Authoritarian, Totalitarian, Post-totalitarian and Sultanistic. These four regime types are mostly 
related to the question on the possibility of consolidating the democracy, and are to a very little extend related to the 
question on who controls and initiates the transition itself. We will therefore not elaborate more on the other regime types 
in this thesis, but focusing on the authoritarian regime only.  
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pluralism, and that sultanistic regimes are highly personalistic and without a rule by 
law (Ibid: 38-65). One could have argued that it is impossible to define Indonesia as 
an authoritarian regime according to Linz and Stepan's definition. What seems most 
problematic with their definition is that they claim that an authoritarian regime does 
not have any guiding ideology. Indonesian leaders have with the Pancasila-ideology 
and later at least with the concept of the "New Order Democracy" developed an 
ideology that in many sences was totalitarian. However, the existence of a pluralism 
both within the economy and also, though often limited, within the organisations in 
the civil society are arguments for defining Indonesia as an authoritarian regime 
during the time of President Suharto, as long as limited pluralism is a key feature of 
authoritarian regimes according to Linz and Stepan. The existence of a strong 
military beside the strong personalistic rule of Suharto makes it difficult to argue that 
Indonesia was a sultanistic regime. Hence we will argue that Indonesia was an 
authoritarian regime through the Suharto-period. Although Suharto called the 
political system for a "New Order Democracy" it can never be argued that Indonesia 
was a democracy during his presidency, since only three political parties were 
allowed to participate in elections where his own Golkar-party through the election 
laws was more or less guarantied to get the majority of seats in the parliament, or at 
least Suharto himself controlled the election of the majority of representatives to 
MPR who were electing him as a president. 
6.2 Necessary and ideal pre-conditions for a transition 
Linz and Stepan find that one of the must's for a transition to democracy is the 
existence of a sovereign state (Linz and Stepan 1996: 17f). According to Charles 
Tilly a "state" is "an organization which controls the population occupying a definite 
territory ... in so far as it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the 
same territory; it is autonomous; its divisions are formally coordinated with one 
another" (Tilly 1975: 70). One implication based on Tilly’s reflection of the state, is 
that it is impossible to have a democratic transition in a colonial state. Indonesia is 
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not a colony anymore, but whether the Indonesian state is controlling all of the 
population within its border is a doubtful question. It is nevertheless clearly 
differentiated from other organisations operating in the same territory. There are and 
have been several separatist groups that claim independence for there own area, such 
as East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya, but this should not lead us not to recognise 
Indonesia as a sovereign state, hence this criteria for a transition to democracy seem 
to be fulfilled. International pressure did however lead to the referendum that gave 
East-Timor its independence in 1999. The fear of utterly balcanisation seems to have 
been among the key issues for Team of Seven. 
As Linz and Stepan are very structure-oriented when they set out to investigate the 
possibilities of creating a consolidated democracy, they are not too occupied with the 
drafting-phase of the electoral laws since the drafting process are a more actor-
oriented phase. Their structure-oriented approach is nevertheless worthful in 
describing how difficult it is for a multi-ethnical and multi-religious state as 
Indonesia to become a democracy. When discussing the efforts that needs to be taken 
for creating a democracy they say that "would-be democracy crafters in charge of the 
state apparatus must take into careful consideration the particular mix of nations, 
cultures, and awakened political identities present in the territory" (Ibid: 35). 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the crafters of the Indonesian election laws have 
taken this into consideration, when we know how difficult they made the possibilities 
for separatists from for instance Aceh to form their own political parties. However, 
we can also argue that they took this into consideration, as leaving that problem 
outside by claiming that all parties should aknowledge Pancasila, is a way of securing 
a common understanding of the state within the mixed society. 
6.3 Transition from above or below? 
The theories normally make a differentiation between transition intended or 
controlled from above and transition intended or controlled from below. There are a 
lot of literature on transitions, and most of them also seem to be occupied with the 
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possibilities each type of transitions have of leading to a consolidated democracy. 
This is not a necessary criterion for this thesis since we are interested in the alliances 
in the early stage of the transition. 
The differentiation between transition from above or below is only suitable for 
transitions that have their roots in the domestic sphere. Hence, transitions based on 
wars or foreign direct pressures are not included in these theories. Those are not 
relevant for the Indonesian case either, even though there was a kind of an 
international pressure for reform from IMF among others. This pressure was not 
directly channelled, as it to the extend that it existed, must have been channelled 
indirect through opposition groups and/or the sitting regime. We have to ask which 
group in the Indonesian society that intended the transition. Therefore we will leave 
the questions regarding the international pressure for a while, before we will 
elaborate more on them in the analyses that will come in the last chapters of this 
thesis.  
Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter have made a valuable contribution to the 
transition theories. In an article from 1991 they structuralized the transitions after two 
variables. The first variable is "actors". Who produce the transition, the masses or the 
elites? The second variable is the "strategy" the actors use. Is the transition forced 
through, or do the actors make compromise with other actors? The different 
combination of variables leads to four modes of transitions (see figure 6.1 below). 
The problem with the variables is that they are all ideal types of transition, in the 
weberian sense of the word; hence all transitions in history are not covered by any of 
the four boxes in figure 6.1. Nevertheless it is very usefull in the Indonesian case. 
They describe revolution as when the masses by force defeat the previous leaders. 
Reform is when the masses develop a pressure on the regime which results in a 
compromise about entering into a transition without having to use violence. 
Imposition is when the elites use force in order of bringing a change to the regime. 
Finally, pact is when the elites make a compromise among themselves to have a 
transition (Karl and Schmitter 1991: 275f). Although the point of departure for Karl 
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and Schmitter is transitions in Latin America, Southern- and Eastern Europe, they 
give in their article a valuable contribution to the debate on transitions that also is 
interesting to have in mind in the case of the Indonesian transition. Karl and 
Schmitter state that many cases are difficult to classify as one of the four modes of 
transition (Ibid.:277).  
 
ACTORS
ELITES
 MASSES
   STRATEGY
COMPROMISE FORCE
Multilateral  .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .    .   .    .    .    .   . Unilateral
PACT IMPOSITION
REFORM REVOLUTION
 
Figure 6.1 Modes of transitions  
Source:  Karl and Schmitter 1991: 275 
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When we take a closer look we will see that this is also the case with the Indonesian 
transition. What started as protests in the streets against the Chinese merchants and 
the government because of higher prices on rice, fuel and other commodities, ended 
up with transition where also members of Golkar took an active part in bringing their 
own president to withdraw. If we put the Indonesian events into the ideal types of 
Karl and Schmitter, we will see that it started as a reform where the masses 
demonstrated. Some passages were nearly revolutionary, for example when the 
students surrounded and almost occupied the parliament in mid-May 1998. After 
Suharto stepped down the initiatives were no longer with the masses, hence the elites 
had got the initiative. Whether the drafting process of the election laws is 
characterised by compromise between elites or by unilateral force is left to discuss, 
but I will argue that the rest of the Indonesian transition is characterised as a "pact". 
Linz and Stepan do also describe a pact-variable which they call "reforma-pactada, 
ruptura-pactada" (1996: 57ff). Our short discussion, on which box we have to put the 
Indonesian transition into, shows us at least one major difficulty with Karl and 
Schmitter’s approach, that of shifting initiatives throughout the transition. On the 
other hand, by focusing on the forces that initiate the transition, it is clear for the 
Indonesian case that the government took over control from the masses when they 
formed the Team of Seven even before Suharto had stepped down. The government 
wanted to be in the forefront of the situation, and they planned for a transition while 
the people were still demonstrating in the streets. 
 Many theories, as we will see, tend to be too static when defining different kinds of 
transitions. One can of course assume that this is a way of pointing out a major 
tendency by using a sort of Weberian ideal types, because one wants to build a new 
theoretical framework for future discussions. The major obstacle with such an 
argument is that the reality seldom is totally suitable to the theory, and this is also a 
problem with the article by Karl and Schmitter. Another problem is this rather 
philosophical, but anyhow important argument, that revolutions have a tendency of 
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eating their own children14. We will not at this moment enter into a deep discussion 
on who the children of the Indonesian transition are, or on which persons or groups 
who the hungry one was eating them. The only thing we have to state here is that 
there also in the Indonesian transition were different people or groups of people who 
were initiating the changes at different times, and that it is peculiar to find that the 
students who were in the forefront in the beginning of the transition were more or less 
left outside the decision-making arena when the elites settled down to make the 
election laws. 
6.4 Transition from above and below? 
The discussion on Karl and Schmitter's approach leaves us with one major question: 
Is there any literature that absorbs the contradictory facts of a transition that is 
initiated both from above and below? Atul Kohli brought up this dilemma in an 
article printed in Third World Quarterly (1993). One of the most significant 
observations related to the question regarding the Indonesian election laws comes 
when Kohli analyses empirical examples of transitions. Kohli then says that 
transitions can be viewed "as a result of some combination of two underlying 
processes: intra-elite factionalism creating weakness at the 'top' of the old regime: and 
growing pressures from below ⎯ from a civil society ⎯ to open the authoritarian 
regime" (Ibid: 673). Furthermore he argues, "intra-elite divisions appear in many 
cases ... to have been exacerbated by economic crises" (Ibid: 673). Kohli states that 
these crisis has "narrowed the room for authoritarian states to manoeuvre, 
undermined whatever limited performance-based legitimacy the old regimes may 
have possessed, and intensified disagreements among ruling élites over future paths" 
and that "irrespective of its origins, a divided élite both encouraged mobilisation from 
below and made it difficult to sustain a highly authoritarian situation" (Ibid: 673).  
                                              
14 This argument is well known by historian, and is often refered to when discussing the events in the French Revolution in 
1789.   
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The fact that the Indonesian crisis started out with an economic crisis leading the 
people to riot against high prices on commodities as rice and fuel, is therefore 
suitable to Kohli’s thinking. And we know that Suharto was asked by General 
Wiranto to withdraw, hence there had been “disagreements among the ruling elites 
over future paths (Kohli 1993: 673). What we therefore have to look for is whether 
this also narrowed Habibies room to manoeuvre, and which alliances he therefore had 
to build to stay in power. 
This is a somewhat different starting point for a democratic transition than what the 
so-called "modernisation school" presented in the 50's and 60's. One of the 
modernisation-theorists, Seymour Lipset, argued as an example in his "Political Man" 
(1960) that greater economic affluence is generally related to prospects for a stable 
democracy. Between these two viewpoints we can find for instance Barrington 
Moore (1966) who argued that economic modernisation may lead to both democracy 
and dictatorship Although Kohli mentioned that an economic crisis may lead to the 
breakdown of the authoritarian power and that this furthermore can lead to a 
transition towards democracy, but he did not argue that such a crisis either have to 
lead to democracy, or that this is a necessary pre-condition. However, in Indonesia 
the economic crisis led to democracy, a result that 32 years of improved economic 
conditions under Suharto had not given. 
What is important with Kohli's contribution is that he recognises the simultaneous 
correlation between the elite factionalism and the anti-authoritarian forces as crucial 
for creating enough political space for a successful democratic transition. He says that 
the political motivation for the different civil society-groups varied, and that "their 
political capacity to sustain themselves beyond 'transitions' also turned out to be 
weak" (Ibid: 673). The only common feature of those civil society- groups is in most 
cases that they have been anti-authoritarian. Kohli also mentions that international 
influences of varying types may have been an important factor for giving strength to 
the civil society activism, directly or indirectly. 
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Kohli is not only occupied with the preconditions for transition, he also goes further 
ahead in his article talking about legitimacy for new democratic institutions. He says 
that parties and parliaments often "are fragile in most countries that have recently 
transisted from authoritarianism" (Ibid: 675). Even more "a typical outcome follows: 
irrespective of the levels of civil society activism during the anti-authoritarian phase, 
power in many a new democracy comes to rest in the hands of a few individuals, if 
not a single leader" (Ibid: 675). This is almost the same thoughts as the famous 
argument of Robert Michels that "the fundamental sociological law of political 
parties ... is (a) organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the 
electors, of the mandataries over mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. 
Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels 1915: 401). What about the power 
of the masses in the transition phase? Kohli adds that "once they (i.e. mobilised but 
unorganised groups) have served their political purposes" they "add considerable 
volatility to the polity" (Ibid.: 675).   
 We know that a variety of civil society groups including student-movements, 
democratisation-movements and other NGOs as for instance the religious based 
organisation Muhammadyiah united in a common effort of breaking the old regime. 
If Kohli's contribution makes sense, we may have to look for possible intra-elite 
factionalism in Indonesia as a pre-condition for the transition. Therefore it makes 
sence to use the analysis of Atul Kohli as a starting point to search for a possible 
intra-elite factionalism also in the drafting process of the election laws. If we find 
such factionalism, we will also have to search for a possible alliance between groups 
or individuals within the elite and anti-authoritarian forces within the civil society-
groups at the grassroots level. 
6.5 Actors and context  
According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan there are two actor-centered variables that 
are concerning the leadership basis of the prior non-democratic regime and the 
question of whom are initiating and controlling a transition (Linz and Stepan 1996: 
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66 ff). Actor-centered variables are of special interest in this thesis where we are 
focusing on the legislators behind the election laws. Hence, we are interested in 
theories that explain possible correlations between a set of actors and a set of possible 
outcomes in a period of transition. 
The first of their actor-centered variables is concerning the institutional composition 
and leadership of the preceding non-democratic regime. Their main question is 
regarding what the institutional character of the state elite is. The state elite is here 
referred to as «the core group that is in day-by-day control of the state apparatus» 
(Linz and Stepan 1996: 66).  This is a distinct variable from that of regime types, and 
Linz and Stepan define four different types of state elites: -a hierarchical military, -a 
non-hierarchical military, -a civilian elite, -the distinctive category of sultanistic 
elites. 
Due to the existence of a strong military presence in the Indonesian state apparatus 
the two variables concerning a hierarchical and a non-hierarchical military will have 
to be analysed briefly here. Linz and Stepan argue, «only an authoritarian regime has 
the possibility of being controlled by a hierarchical military organization» (Ibid: 66). 
This implies that their three other regime types, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and 
sultanistic regimes cannot be controlled by such a military organisation, and as we 
argued in chapter 5.1.2 above, Indonesia did during Suharto's presidency for many 
reasons fit into the main characteristics of an authoritarian regime. Regimes with a 
strong military presence have normally been viewed upon as unfavourable to 
democratisation. It is therefore surprisingly when Linz and Stepan state that "all 
hierarchical military regimes share one characteristic that is potentially favourable to 
democratic transition", which is that "the officer corps, taken as a whole, see itself as 
a permanent part of the state apparatus, with enduring interests and permanent 
functions that transcend the interests of the government of the day" (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 66-67). The implication of this is that there is a "possibility that the hierarchical 
leaders of the military-as-institution will come to the decision that the costs of direct 
involvement in nondemocratic rule are greater than the costs of extrication" (Ibid: 
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67). This is an argument that is very interesting to in the Indonesian case where 
Suharto first withdrew after having received the advice to step down from the head of 
ABRI, General Wiranto. This incident is itself an important argument for claiming 
that Indonesia had a hierarchical military. Linz and Stepan continue by saying that 
"paradoxically but predictably, democratic elections are thus often part of the 
extrication strategy of military institutions that feel threatened by their prominent role 
in nondemocratic regimes" (Ibid: 67).  
Linz and Stepan are for many reasons less optimistic about the possibility hierarchical 
military regimes have of becoming consolidated democracies. One of the reasons is 
that since the military is a permanent part of the state apparatus they will always have 
a privileged access to coercive resources, hence "members of the military will be an 
integral part of the machinery that the new democratic government has to manage" 
(Ibid: 67). There are therefore also reasons for arguing that a drafting process of new 
election laws as a part of the transition can be influenced by the military in countries 
where there is an authoritarian regime with a hierarchical military. And in Indonesia 
we have seen how Team of Seven proposed to give the military seats in parliament. 
The question in our case is therefore whether the military initiated and controlled the 
transition, and this leads us to Linz and Stepan’s second actor-centered variable, that 
of who initiates and control the transition (Linz and Stepan 1996: 71-72). The 
Habibie-government may be viewed upon as being an interim regime between the 
authoritarian regime of Suharto and the democratic election in June 1999. The 
legitimacy of the Habibie-government was low, and Habibie also made it clear when 
he took power that there were one main objective for his presidency – that of 
establishing a new set of election laws in order to have a general election as soon as 
possible or at least within a year after he came to power. Linz and Stepan argue about 
interim governments in cases where armed forces have brought them into power that 
they “frequently…. develop a dynamic that moves them away from fully free 
contestation” (Ibid: 71). If we follow their argument here, we could develop an 
opposite argument in the Indonesian case that says that if the election laws do not 
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lead to a fully free contestation, then the military might have had too much power in 
the Indonesian democratic transition! We might on the other hand also consider that 
the Habibie-government was not an interim government. Habibie was after all the 
vice-president of Suharto, and he was therefore Suharto’s legally successor as 
president of Indonesia. If that is the case, the transition towards democracy must be 
regarded as a state- or regime-initiated and –controlled transition, as we have also 
discussed previous regarding the theories of Karl and Schmitter. 
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7 OBSTACLES AND ALLIANCES IN THE 
DRAFTING PROCESS 
7.1 Limited time-frame for the debate 
There is one aspect one should remember, where there are huge differences between 
the most well established democracies in the west and the newest one that has been 
established during the last two decades. The oldest democracies have been 
established through generations and not in a few years, as is the situation for the 
transitions in the newborn democracies like the one in Indonesia. The election laws 
have also been formed during a long time in the oldest democracies, and most 
important is that the electorate itself has through elections had the opportunity to take 
part in the formation and a continuous evaluation of the laws. In many ways it can be 
said that the electorate therefore has been able to form election laws that suit 
themselves. 
 Moreover the election laws have in many countries been changed so that a higher 
percentage of the population can participate within the formal democratic structures 
due to some group’s outstanding demonstration for democratic power. This was the 
situation when labour groups demanded the right to vote for themselves, when 
women got the right to vote. Stein Rokkan (1987) shows in his work how this process 
influenced the composition of parties within the different parliaments in the 
democracies in Western Europe. This change over time of the election laws represent 
a significant contrast to the field and period of research for this thesis where the 
electorate had no chance to respond to the election laws through elections.  
When it comes to Indonesia, the official drafting process lasted only in eight months, 
from the end of May 1998 to the end of January 1999. On the other hand, LIPIs 
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contribution and the fact that Ryaas Rasyid was asked to form a group15 before 
Suharto witdrew give us indications that the process was started before and that it 
therefore took at least a little more than eight months.  
In order of making good election laws and have enough time to discuss them before 
voting in parliament and to implement them before the election, we clearly can see 
that it took to short time from May 21st 1998 until June 7th 1999. One of the best 
explanations of this argument is all the obstacles that were left out of the drafting 
process that the General Election Commitee (KPU) had to clearify before MPR met 
autumn 1999 to choose the next President of Indonesia, who was to become 
Abdurrahman Wahid. Some of those obstacles were, who is going to be functional 
group representatives in MPR, who is going to represent the different parties in 
parliament (DPR), and how is the seat allocation for parliament in total going to be. 
KPU had to discuss intensively on those issues as the election laws were totally 
unclear on some of those points. 
On the other hand the limited time-frame for the drafting process is also mentioned 
by Mallarangeng and other persons as a reason for why they were not discussing 
several aspects of a transition, as for instance to establish a federal system 
(Mallarangeng 1999).  
But did everyone think that it was a short time-frame? When Suharto withdrew, the 
students continued demanding democracy. Habibie was a new president, but still he 
was part of the old regime, elected as a vice-president under Suharto. The students 
were generally unhappy with the transfer of power to Habibie (Eklöf 1999). It was 
therefore a chance that Habibie had listened to the demonstrating masses and stepped 
down immediately in May 1998, but he did not. Instead on May 23rd,  two days after 
Suharto stepped down, Habibie invited some of the people who had been the most 
visible reformists demanding democracy and demanding Suharto to withdraw, to his 
                                              
15 Team of Seven 
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home. Among them were Amien Rais (leader of Muhammadiyah, the second largest 
Indonesian Islamic organisation who had been one of Suharto’s strongest and most 
visible opponents for the previous month), Nurcholish Madjid (a muslim scholar), 
Adnan Buyung Nasution (reforminst human rights lawyer), and Rudini (former 
Minister of Internal Affairs who had allready asked Rasyid to form Team of Seven) 
(Hosen 2003 b). For Habibie it was of vital importance that these people accepted his 
plan of holding an election as soon as possible, as this would secure him some 
months to prepare for the election, and save him from the immediate withdrawel. And 
they made a pact with him and accepted a plan. So, for Habibie the drafting process 
gave him the chance to overcome the urgent political and economical crisis of 
Indonesia.  
Habibie here stated an example that he knew that his room to manoeuvre was 
narrowed, so that he had to make an alliance with the opposition. At the same time 
this is also veryfication of Kohli’s argument that the political motivation for the 
different civil society-groups varied, and that "their political capacity to sustain 
themselves beyond 'transitions' also turned out to be weak" (Kohli 1993: 673). The 
only common feature of those civil society- groups is in most cases that they have 
been anti-authoritarian. In the Indonesian transition, the move of Habibie both 
secured his agenda of holding an election and staying in power for at least one more 
year, and it wiped out the students and other more radical parts of the opposition so 
that opposition was splitted in two parts. This was of vital importance to Habibie, but 
it was also of vital importance to the moderate middle-class oppostion who was 
invited to take part in the political work of the democratic transition. I will argue that 
this certainly also influenced how the new election laws were made. 
Although it might have seemed as if the elite among the demonstrating masses 
represented by Amien Rais and other made a pact with Habibie when he came to 
power in May 1998, we shall remember that a major coup of the drafting process 
allready was made by Suharto when he decided to ask Ryaas Rasyid to form a 
drafting comittee a few days before Suharto stepped down. Nevertheless, Habibie 
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seems to have taken control from the very beginning of his presidency, and then 
making a pact with some of the oposition, as Karl and Schmitter would have called it 
according to their figure (1991: 275). So after having started as a reform or almost a 
revolution, I will argue that the transition now turned towards a pact. We will below 
see how this pact influenced the possibility of new parties to evolve, as we will see 
how the law number 2 (1999) on political parties was favourable to the opposition 
making the pact. 
7.2 Limited time-frame for new parties 
Allthough the drafting process would secure Habibie at least one year as a president 
of Indonesia, the timetable he set up was very short. Within one year parliament had 
to decide on new election laws, and even more, a three-party system was going to 
become a multiparty democracy. Within this time, after new laws were adopted by 
parliament on January 29th 1999 and until the March 1999, new political parties had 
to be established and registered. One of the obstacles for new parties was that in order 
to be allowed to contest any of the elections a party had to have established party 
organisations in at least 9 out of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, and in at least half of the 
regencies or municipalities within those nine provinces (Indonesian Law number 
2/1999). I will discuss later on how this influenced the possibility of establishing 
regional based parties. First we have to ask: who would benefit from this rule? There 
is one obvious answer to that question: The nationwide organitations that allready 
existed and who were allowed under Suharto’s New Order. Loose organisations, 
student groups who had been demonstrating against Suharto and groups with limited 
economically resources would have no chance to become established within the 
framework set up by the new election laws.  
I will therefore argue that this is also a sign of the pact between the ruling 
government and the big organisations in society, as this rule would make it so 
difficult for smaller organisations and regional based organisations to be established. 
Furthermore, this is also a proof that the students were only instrumental in 
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demonstrating for Suharto’s withdrawel, and that they did not have any power at all 
when it came to the rest of the transition period.  
Besides the big NGOs, there was one other group that could meet the criteria set 
above, and that was ABRI-representatives. As the military through their dwifungsi-
role were situated on various places througout the archipelago, some of their generals 
(retired or not) had both the economical and organisational capasity to form new 
political parties. Among the 48 parties that became certified for contesting the 
election, some of them had retired generals as their party-leader. 
All other groups wanting to contest the election did not either have the institutional 
capacity, the economic funding or the sufficient time to establish themselves. 
7.3 The introduction of Islam in the Pancasila-state 
The big Non-governmental organisations that could favour from this was at least the 
two huge Indonesian muslim organisations, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) led by the 
Habibie’s successor as president Abdurrahman Wahid, and Muhammadiyah which 
was led by Amien Rais who was central in demonstrating against Suharto and on the 
May 23rd meeting with Habibie (see above). Both of them had several million 
members and supporters. However, in order of beeing allowed to contest the elections 
one paragraph had to be changed, and as I mentioned in chapter 2.1 above it was. The 
paragraph from the 1984 law, requiring individual organisations to adopt Pancasila as 
their sole ideology, was eliminated. The new law allows political parties to have 
religion as their founding ideology, although they must support the unity of the 
republic of Indonesia, Pancasila as the state ideology, and the 1945 Constitution. By 
this change the pact was a fact, and the big Muslim organisations made their entrance 
into party politics of Indonesia after having been surpressed politically by Suharto. 
And the state and the largest civil society groups could meet on the same arena, and 
in the Indonesian case this was also possible without having to fear that the two big 
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Muslim organisations would demand sharia as they are moderate, at least on the 
national level (Hefner 2000). 
7.4 Centrally or regional focus? 
One of IDEAs advices is to “Err on he Side of Inclusion” so that the “electoral system 
should produce a parliament which errs on the side of including all significant 
interests. Regardless of whether minorities are based on ideological, ethnic, racial, 
linguistic, regional or religious identities, the exclusion of opinion from parliaments, 
particularly in the developing world, has often been catastrphically counter-
productive” (Reynolds and Reilly 1997: 123). The fact that in order to be allowed to 
contest any of the elections a party had to have established party organisations in at 
least 9 out of Indonesia’s 27 provinces, and in at least half of the regencies or 
municipalities within those nine provinces, meant for instance that regional based 
local parties would have problems with contesting the elections. This is a sign that it 
was a centrally Jakarta-based drafting process where one was afraid to include the 
opinions from the different regions. In an extremely heterogenous society as the 
Indonesian one, where several regional conflicts become more visible to the public 
after Suharto withdrew, the decision was to stay with Pancasila, the unitary state and 
continue working for Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in diversity)16. Another part of 
the problem of inclusion is that the communists were not allowed to take part in the 
election as a party.   
7.5 The determination of parties prior to the election 
The party law did meet much of the demands from the opposition outside parliament. 
It did allow multi-party election, and it opened up for religious Muslim forces to take 
                                              
16 The motto 'Bhinneka Tunggal Ika' (Unity in Diversity) is a slogan from the time of independence signifying the unity of 
the Indonesian people despite the diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. 
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part in the elections. It also helped the forces who wanted to fight for a continued 
united Indonesia, without taking the chances of leading Indonesia into a period of 
balcanisation, except for the independence of East-Timor. Finally it made it easier for 
the large and traditional moderate NGO’s to take part in the elections, and it made it 
difficult for separatists in all the sence of the word to take part in the elections, as 
they would not have a broad enough base or enough time to form a political party. 
In order of being able to determine which political parties which met the criteria in 
the Election law, the Minister of Home Affairs appointed a group of eleven people, 
called Team of Eleven. This was an interim advisory committee that was going to 
work until the General Election Committee, KPU, could be established by 
governmental appointed members and members from the political parties which 
Team of Eleven would determine. Team of Eleven concisted of members from civil 
society and professionals, among them were members of Team of Seven. Nurcholiish 
Madjid, a respected moderate Islamic scholar, was leading the Team. The other 
members of the Team were Miriam Budiarjo, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Adi Andojo 
Soetjipto, Afan Gaffar, Kastorius Sinaga, Andi Mallarangeng, Mulyana Kusumah, 
Eep Saefulloh Fatah, Anas Urbaningrum and Rama Pratama. Both Madjid and 
Nasution were among the little group who met with Habibie on May 23rd 1998 to 
give him advice on the transition process. Urbaningrum, Mallarangeng and Gaffar 
were all members of Team of Seven who had drafted the laws for the government. 
Urbaningrum was also the National Chairman of the Islamic Students Association, 
and was the only person from the student movement that was visible through the 
drafting process. 
148 parties had signed up for the elections, and Team of Eleven worked to determine 
which of them that met the criteria having branches in nine out of the 27 provinces 
and in half of the districts in those provinces. Team of Eleven recommended that only 
48 of the 148 parties met the criteria. The parties that failed had no place to appeal the 
decision. At that time there was a proposal that the parties that failed to win seats in 
parliament in the June 7th election would not be allowed to contest the next general 
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election in 2004. It was therefore crucial for the parties to be allowed to contest the 
first election.  
According to my interview with Adnan Buyung Nasution (1999), Team of Eleven 
was never questioning if the parties supported Pancasila as the state ideology. Hence, 
the parties that were not allowed to contest the elections failed because they did not 
have enough branches. According to Nasution there were discussions within Team of 
Eleven on how many parties that should be allowed to contest the elections. As the 
law opened up for many new parties, but not for all the regional parties that could 
have been there if the laws had been different it supports Atul Kohli’s description that 
one of the main problems when creating new democracies is that a transition often 
has the "seemingly ironic impact of simultaneously creating 'too much' and 'not 
enough' democracy" (Kohli 1993: 672). 
The government seemed to have been worried that it would be to confusing for both 
the voters and also for the possibility of making politics within the new goverment if 
too many political parties were allowed to contest the election. With the composition 
of the members of Team of Eleven, the government had a possible to limit the 
numbers of political parties together with leaders of civil society and some 
professionals who had been supporting the transition to multiparty democracy from 
Habibie’s first days as a president. This again support my argument that this is a pact 
between the government and some of the leading moderate nationwide NGO’s who 
both would have the interest to limit the competion in the forthcoming election. 
7.6 Proportional versus district representation 
In trying to find out who were the propelling forces behind the election laws I will 
now go into some of the points that were discussed widely in the drafting process. I 
will use some of the advices for electoral system designers that The International 
IDEA have given in their handbook of Electoral System Design (Reynolds and Reilly 
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1997: 121 ff) as guidelines as this will help us to explore who was kept out of the 
process. 
IDEAs first advice is to keep it simple and to make an electoral system that “can be 
easily understood by the voter and the politician” (Ibid. 1997: 122). The unique 
Indonesian hybrid between district and proportional system was not at all simple to 
understand, either for the voter, the politician or the General Election Commitee 
(KPU). It thus could confuse them, and it might also have confused the one taking 
part in the drafting process. 
One thing is that it was confusing for the voters, but it might also have been 
confusing for the one who made the proposals. Only one year after the drafting 
process was finished, Andi Mallarangeng from Team of Seven met with Mochtar 
Pabottingi from LIPI to discuss the difference between proportional and district 
system, and what kind of system that would fit Indonesia best. In that debate, as we 
have seen in chapter 5.3 above, Pabottingi took the oposite standing than what he had 
done with LIPI in their proposal where they proposed that Indonesia should move 
towards a district system, while Mallarangeng stood along with the district system 
that Team of Seven had initially proposed before they revised their proposal and 
proposed a mix. So if the persons proposing the system had problems standing with 
their proposal, what would then the situation be for the one deciding on the election 
system? 
It is utterly interesting to find that both Team of Seven in their first proposal and LIPI 
suggested that Indonesia should move towards a district system. Both the members of 
Team of Seven and LIPI were mostly political scientists who were aware of the 
theories of democracies. I have in chapter five discussed some of these theories and 
referred to how Arend Lijphart describes this: “The basic aim of proportional 
representation is to represent both majorities and minorities and, instead of 
overrepresententing or underrepresententing any parties, to translate votes into seats 
proportionally" (Lijphart 1984: 150). I also discussed how Duverger argues that the 
district system (The simple-majority single-ballot system) “favours the two-party 
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system” (1959: 217), and how this is also viable for more modern theories and taken 
into the advices from International IDEA as a clear guidance to new democracies that 
a district or “first past the post”-system will lead towards a competition between two 
major parties (Reynolds and Reilly 1997: 28f). 
With this understanding of the systems, one would think that the persons proposing 
new election laws in a period of democratic transition in one of the world’s most 
heterogenous societies would have proposed that proportional representation would 
have suited Indonesia. When they did not, there must be other reasons for this. In 
chapter six I have referred to how Golkar reacted to Team of Seven’s proposal 
because they feared that they had to contest outside Jakarta. Is this all the truth, or 
were there other obstacles in this debate? We must assume that both Team of Seven 
and LIPI knew that a district system would favour few parties and favour the parties 
that would gain most votes, and that it would make it more difficult for the minor 
parties to become represented. The only reason why there were only three parties in 
parliament within the proportional system in Suharto’s New Order Democracy is that 
only three parties were allowed. The focal point for this discussion is therefore why 
they did not propose a proportional system, only allowing more than three parties to 
contest the election. Did Golkar-members really fear what would happen if they, as 
Afan Gaffar pointed, under a district system would have to spend time fighting in the 
districts far away from Jakarta (Gaffar 1999)? Or was the problem for the ruling 
Golkar-party and the other parties in parliament that they feared that they would gain 
less votes and hence not be represented in parliament? In order of bringing an 
understanding to this, we have to look more into the debate in parliament. 
Golkar had the majority of the seats in the parliament (DPR) and in the MPR based 
on the 1997-election. Hence they could decide on the laws as what would suit them 
most if they acted like one party with a united vote, but they did not seem to do so. 
After Suharto stepped down, there was a vacuum within Golkar, as the leader of the 
nation for the last 32 years stepped down. The position of a vice-president had never 
been a heavy position in the sence that the vice-president did not have a real power 
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and that there was no tradition that a position as a vice-president would give the 
person a chance to in the future become a new president of Indonesia. For 32 years, 
Indonesia had only one president, and in the same time several vice-presidents had 
appeared and disappeared from their positions. Therefore the position of Habibie was 
not too strong when he succeeded as president, and several people within army, 
Golkar and opposition was not in favour of him (Hosen 2003b: 139ff). Hence the 
situation seems to be what Atul Kohli describes as an intra-elite factionalism (Kohli 
1993). 
Team of Seven first presented their draft in a six hour long cabinet-meeting. There 
the factionalism was clear to the one present. In a passage Hoosen describes what 
happened: 
“Habibie said to Rasyid, “That was an excellent presentation. I agree with it, 
and would like to pursue it”. However, State Secretary Akbar Tanjung (also 
the new General Chairman of Golkar) voiced ardent objections. According to 
him, the proposed system departed too radically from past precedent.” (Hosen 
2003b: 148) 
What would Habibie do in this situation? He could listen to his party, he could listen 
to Team of Seven, or he could minimize the pressure on him and his government by 
handing over the proposal to parliament and let them take the debate. Before he did 
the last thing he invited both Rasyid and Tanjung to his home to compromise on a 
draft he could send over to the parliament. In this manoeuvre the district system 
became a mixed proportional system. So on September 16th Habibie passed the law to 
the DPR, and it became their responsibility to finalize the law. After parliament had 
discussed the laws, they passed it to a special session of People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) in November 1998. 
Not only Akbar Tanjung and other central Golkar-members feared the district system. 
The uncertainty on how many votes the ruling Golkar-party could gain through the 
next election also made several oppositional groups outside parliament frustrated of 
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the proposed district system. The leader of Muhammadyia, Amien Rais, feared that 
reforms would continue to favour Golkar. According to Richard Mann this was 
especially related to “any combination of .... district election system with proportional 
representation” (Mann 1999: 77). Amien Rais was quoted saying that such a 
combination “would favour Golkar because the organization still had plenty of 
money to buy the votes of people” and “Golkar is still the most favoured party 
because it’s got everything. It has money and political infrastructure” (Ibid.: 77). In 
October 1998 Golkar stil expected to gain 50 percent of the votes in the coming 
election, down from 74 percent in the last election in 1997 (Ibid.: 85). Such a 
percentage would still have gained most seats in parliament, but as the students 
continued to demonstrate during the autumn, and especially during the special session 
of MPR, some of the major reform leaders such as Amien Rais urged the masses to 
stay quiet. Hence, the students were isolated from the major reform leaders in which 
they had demonstrated side by side against Suharto in May.  At the same time 
members of Golkar must have doubted if they would gain as much as half of the 
votes in the forthcoming election. It was therefore time to rethink the proposed 
district system. Neither the Golkar nor the major outside-parliament opposition 
seemed to be in favour of a pure district system, but of different reasons. The major 
outside-parliament opposition because they still feared that Golkar would gain most 
votes; Golkar, because they feared that they would gain less votes. There were also 
critical voices within the opposition to the system of proportional representation. 
Islamic Student Association, chaired by Team of Seven and Team of Eleven-member 
Anas Urbaningrum, said in a statement that “By agreeing to use the proportional 
system, it may seen as if they (DPR-members) are accommodationg the aspirations of 
the new political parties. But I believe that the reason is that they realize that their 
days in Parliament will be numbered if the district system is used.” and further that 
with PR-system they hope to still be in Parliament “without having to work hard by 
approaching their constituents” (Mann 1999: 120).  
Mulyana Kusuma, Secretary General of KIPP (the Indonesian Independent 
Committee for General Election Monitoring) wrote in The Jakarta Post that “The PR-
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system will be oriented toward the maintenance of the old political format which 
manipulated the working mechanism of a party system in order to reinforce the 
government which is a long way from public control, sustain the low accountability 
of the representatives and obstruct the improvement of the voter’s sense of 
indentification with their representatives...”. He further wrote that “Because 
candidates under the PR-system will be more representative of their political parties 
rather than their constituents, aspirations of the regions for the introduction of the 
widest regional autonomy possible or for the establishment of a federal system of 
administration will be less accommodated and the people will obviously have a much 
weakened sense of being represented” (Mulyana Kusumah in Jakarta Post December 
5th 1998). 
Hence there were two major discussions regarding the PR versus district system. One 
was about the possible allocations of seats in parliament and the possibility of the 
minority to become represented, as Lijphart is discussing (1984). The other 
discussion was about accountability for the elected towards their constituents, and the 
possibility for village people and uneducated to understand and knowing who was 
representing them. The last dimention is not mentioned by Lijphart as important 
enough for heterogenous societies. The Indonesian oppostion opposing PR-system 
seemed to fear that proportional representation could lead to a transition where 
another version of top down democracy instead of a bottom up democracy in which 
they had hoped for. This was probably also the reason for Team of Seven initial 
proposal of a district system. It seems like noone, except LIPI, feared that a district 
system in Indonesia would follow Duverger’s Law, and lead towards a two-party-
system. The opposition opposing the PR-system was not the strong opposition, and it 
was not the ones who represented the major moderate oppositional groups that 
formed the largest political parties.  
A growing support for the new parties as for instance both Megawati Sukarnoputri 
and her party PDI-P, for Abdurrahman Wahid and his PKB led to more uncertainty 
on the result of the election to come. So instead of going for a pure system, the new 
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election system was a compromised hybrid between district elements in a 
proportional system. In the end, all major parties inside and outside parliament agreed 
to stay with the proportional system both because of it simplicity and familiarity. To 
go for a district system could also have postponed the election as it would have taken 
time to draw new district boundaries and prepare both voters and parties for a new 
system (Hosen 2003b). Another reason for staying with PR was that also the major 
opposition groups led by charismatic leaders, such as Amien Rais, Abdurrahman 
Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri, hoped to benefit from a national party list 
system, rather than fighting locally with their unknown candidates. So at last the 
Golkar-party in this case won over its president Habibie, who was in favour of Team 
of Seven’s district system proposal. I will therefore state that the elite was divided 
between the government and the party, and the opposition was divided between the 
students and the traditional democracy-movement on one side and the major civil 
society organisations on the other side. With the major civil society groups17 I will 
define NU, Muhammadyah, and I will also for the last chapters include PDI-P and 
some other major organisations. PDI-P was led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the 
daughter of the father of the nation, Indonesias first President, Sukarno. 
The compromised hybrid on new election system was made on vague formulations. 
Therefore the General Election Committee had major discussions on how to allocate 
seats to parliament after the election. This was foreseened by the American National 
Democratic Insitute (NDI) who as early as February 23rd 1999, only three weeks after 
the new laws were adopted, reported that “the new law appears to be the result of 
last-minute political compromises. These compromises resulted in an election system 
apparently without exact precedent or parallel anywhere else in the world” and “the 
law itself provides only general principles; details about exactly how the system will 
work remain to be specified” (NDI 1999). As the election committe consisted of 50 
percent governmental appointed members and rest party-appointed members, the 
                                              
17 When I in this thesis use terms as “the big NGO’s” and the moderate middle-class oppositon, I will refer to the same 
group. 
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government did have a heavy control also over the allocation of seats to the 
parliament. 
7.7 Military representation 
It was clear that most forces outside parliament, including the NGO-consortium 
opposed any representation in parliament from groups or people who was not elected. 
Hence, the ABRI-representation should be abolished. When the military (ABRI) got 
their representation in parliament this has to do with their power. It was general 
Wiranto who asked Suharto to step down, and there were rumours and fears about a 
coup d’etat during Habibies presidency. I have in chapter 6 discussed how Linz and 
Stepan is looking on the status of the military. They say that "all hierarchical military 
regimes share one characteristic that is potentially favourable to democratic 
transition", which is that "the officer corps, taken as a whole, see itself as a permanent 
part of the state apparatus, with enduring interests and permanent functions that 
transcend the interests of the government of the day" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 66-67).  
And in Indonesia they were given seats in the parliament, even in a so called 
democatic transition. Mallarangeng said in my interview with him that “there is no 
way to send this proposal to parliament without compromising and letting them have 
seats” (Mallarangeng 1999). Nobody knows what would have happened if they had 
not got any seats, but, as the status of the military was strong, by giving them seats, 
they got recognition and the transition to democracy could move on. 
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8 WHAT WERE THE PROPELLING FORCES? 
The new democracy in Indonesia was implemented in a very short time. It took only 
382 days from Suharto was forced to step down until the new multiparty election was 
held on June 7th 1999. During that period Habibie as a new president had initiated a 
reform of the election laws, there were still several demonstrations against the ruling 
regime and several new parties were founded and prepared for the new election. In 
this thesis I have focused on the process leading to the new election laws, the 
framework for the new democracy.  I started out with a hypothesis, and I will now 
discuss it more thourougly: 
8.1 Did the dominant group decide on an election law that 
would maximise its possibility of staying in position? 
One of the main dilemmas of this analysis has been that whatever election law Golkar 
decided on, the outcome of the election did not give the same result as they and the 
opposition inside and outside parliament had guessed on. I have in this thesis 
discussed how the notion of the different system, proportional representation versus 
district system, was taken into consideration in the debate. The major oppositional 
groups outside parliament followed Lijphart’s assumption, and feared that Golkar 
could gain so many votes that they with a district system would secure their position 
in parliament. And on the other side the president started out going for a district 
system, but his Golkar-party fellows in parliament doubted more and more that they 
would gain as many votes as needed to stay in position with a district system.  
When the election came on June 7th Golkar gained only 22 percent of the votes. 
Nevertheless, as I have discussed in chapter 2, rationalising post-election is not 
logical valid and will not of course give any answer to my question as most people 
thaught Golkar would gain a lot more votes at the time when the election laws were 
adopted. However, the result of the election at least tells us that the calculation on 
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election system from the government and from Golkar has not been by any means 
sufficient for their ambitions of staying in power.  
It might seems that Golkar’s view on the debate between proportional and district 
system tended to have been overshadowed by their focus on accountability; hence 
Lijpharts’ (1984) theories on election systems and seat allocation played a minor role 
in their discussions. Golkar-members of parliament were afraid to fight for their seat 
in small districts far away from Jakarta where they were not known as a person but 
only for the party they represented. Therefore it was important for Golkar to stay with 
the proportional system. This is also one of many possible reasons why they did not 
open up for regional based parties, as this would have led to fight against parties with 
a local base. However, Golkar was supported by the major opposition parties on this, 
as they representing the broad muslimorganisations and PDI-P18 had charismatic well 
known leaders on national level who thaught they would gain more votes based on 
their leaders than on their local party members and the districts. Therefore it seems 
like the debate on election system was more pragmatically than politically oriented. It 
was also more oriented towards securing that the candidates would not have to face 
the voters, than that the votes were allocated to secure that both the majority and 
minority could be represented. By choosing to continue with a proportional-based 
system the parliament by a paradoxe seem to both reform the system by including 
more than three parties, and to secure a status quo with continuing to keep the 
distance between the parties and their representatives on one side and the voters on 
the other. 
On the other side, Team of Seven tried to inforce accountability of the party 
representatives towards their constituents, and would therefore move the power from 
Jakarta towards the electors in the districts. When their proposal on a district system 
was neglected by Golkar, it was probably because of the accountability and not 
because of a calculation of possible seat allocations. However, president Habibie 
                                              
18 The leader of PDI-P was Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daugher of Indonesia first president Sukarno 
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supported Team of Seven. Allthough we should remember that his support came in 
an early phase of the transition during the summer of 1998 while most people still 
believed that Golkar could benefit in seats from a district system, the different 
positions of Habibie and Golkar-members in parliament on this point shows us that 
there were disagreements within the ruling party. This disagreement led to different 
negotiations, to new alliances and was a sign of factionalism within the ruling party. 
Only Habibie and the Golkar-members of parliament would know if their efforts in 
the debate were a big miscalculation, or if they did not have any other possibility than 
to move for free election with an understanding that Golkar’s time of reigning 
Indonesia was over. 
8.2 The effort of keeping Indonesia united 
If the choice of an election system was a result of long and though negotiations 
within parliament and between parliament and outside opposition, the debate on 
federalism and the inclusion of regional parties were apart from some incidents a 
quiet one. The major obstacle to this quietness was that international pressure gave 
East-Timor the possibility of helding a referendum on August 31st 1999 that gave the 
province independence from Indonesia. In the debate of election laws it was 
important for most major parts to keep Indonesia united. Federalism was almost not 
discussed, both due to historical reasons and because their was not enough time 
within the drafting process to also discuss and agree on changing from a unitarian to a 
federal state. The party law imposed parties to have a broad regional base in at least 
nine provinces and was hence a guarantee towards securing a stabile democracy, 
allthough excluding separatists movements in parliament could be a danger if it had 
not been for the military. 
As I have discussed both Team of Seven and the major parties inside and outside 
parliament were in favour of keeping ABRI-representation in parliament. This would 
hopefully secure a stabile Indonesia, and could also be seen as a guarantee for those 
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people fearing that the military otherwise could have made a coup d’etat. ABRI’s 
position remained strong through the drafting process. It was General Wiranto who 
asked Suharto to withdraw, and as the political crisis in May 1998 peaked, “Amien 
Rais and others continued to keep open lines of communication with the military and 
other regime leaders, stressing their desire for a negotiated transition” (Aspinall 2000: 
348). ABRI had been the stabile defenders of a united Indonesia by their dwifungsi-
role through the entire presidency of Suharto. By giving them seats in parliament, 
they would still remain in their position. On the other hand this also shows that the 
military played a role in the drafting process. And as I have discussed in chapter 7.2 
above military representatives could also favour from the party laws and the 
requirement for a base in 9 out of 27 provinces. This could lead to a new opportunity 
for retired generals and other military leaders to continue in politics based on their 
powerbase in the districts of Indonesia, allthough they then have to fight as civil and 
not military leaders. 
8.3 How did the ruling regime co-operate with other 
parties, NGOs and/or parts of the civil society in? 
The transition theories of Karl and Schmitter, Linz and Stepan and Atul Kohli, as I 
have discussed in chapter 6 above, all recognise the importance of alliances between 
the ruling regime and other groups during a transition. This was as we have seen also 
vital in Indonesia. At the very first days of Habibie’s presidency he invited Amien 
Rais and others in opposition to co-operate for making a timetable for a democratic 
reform. Both Rais and other middle class and moderate NGO-leaders were confident 
with Habibie’s idea of creating a new multiparty democracy and an agreement close 
to what Karl and Schmitter calls a pact was made. Aspinall also discuss this when he 
says that “allthough there was no explicit pact between opposition and government, 
as occured in some of the Latin American transitions over a decade earlier, an 
implicit compromise was thus reached (Aspinall 2000: 350).  
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As I have discussed, the main leaders of the opposition, i.e. Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais, benefited a lot with the new election laws as 
they were among the only NGO’s with a network large enough to form parties and 
contest the election as they were represented all over Indonesia. Besides that, the 
proportional system gave all of them a chance to be represented in parliament, and 
the accountability towards the party and not towards the constituents gave them the 
possibility of fighting by their national charismatic leader, and not by and unknown 
fellow in the districts.  
New pacts and new alliances were built between NGO-leaders and the government. 
And also the military seemed to have been involved in alliances with the major NGO-
leaders as they gained representation in parliament.  
On the other hand the major NGO-leaders shifted side. First they, at least Amien 
Rais, stayed side by side with the student organisations and the democracy-movement 
demonstrating against Suharto. Bus as soon as Suharto withdrew; the major NGOs 
shifted side and offered both ABRI and the new president a chance to cooperate. By 
that pact, the students, who had been seen as a symbol of the fight against Suharto 
was again left out in the street, while major oppositionals entered the arena of 
civilised negotiations with the government. By this effort, the rest of the drafting 
process and transition to democracy was a top-down-oriented pact that gave the 
student, regional and traditional democratic movement little or non influence on the 
result. 
There was also another shift in the major NGO-leaders position. After making a pact 
with Habibie on the timetable for new elections and ensuring that they would keep 
silent they also shifted side when it came to supporting Habibie’s and Team of 
Seven’s proposal for a district system. On this issue they supported Akbar Tanjung 
and Golkar-party in parliament. However, I cannot find that this shift was in 
opposition to the pact that had been made, as I find this only as a pragmatic and not 
political issue for the NGO-leaders. 
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9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
I started out by asking what were the main propelling forces behind the election laws, 
and whose advice, if any, did the legislators of the laws follow in their decision-
making? My analysis has shown that some of the problems that a non-democratic 
elected parliament and government have to deal with in a transition from 
authoritarian regime towards a democracy.  
First of all, after the opposition with the support of the military had forced Suharto to 
step down, it seems to be clear that the new President Habibie had to seek support for 
his project of opening up for a democratic election also outside the parliament. 
Habibie therefore quickly after he took power, started his work to gain support from 
the big and moderate NGOs who was the middle-class opposition that had 
demonstrated against Suharto. These NGOs, represented by Amien Rais and others, 
therefore accepted Habibies project, and at the same time the radical oppostion was 
left out. By this way Habibie made an outstanding maneouvre and changed the 
transition so that the initiatives were no longer with the masses, hence the elites had 
got the initiative. If we put this into the figure of Karl and Schmitter (1991) we have 
seen that this is a sign that the transition moved from being a reform to being a pact. 
Habibie’s room to manoeuvre was at the same time what Kohli would call narrowed 
(Kohli 1993: 673). He therefore did not dare to decide on new election laws himself 
after Team of Seven had made their proposal. So when Habibie was confronted by 
the the new General Chairman of Golkar Akbar Tanjung who thaught the proposed 
system departed too radically from the past, President Habibie decided to pass the 
discussion of the election laws to the Parliament. The ruling elite was therefore 
divided, and it was up the members of parliament to negotiate. 
The discussion in Parliament ended up with the adoption of new laws in late January 
1999, only few months before the general election, and it therefore gave the new 
parties limited time to prepare themselves. Even though both the governments own 
group, Team of Seven, and other groups like LIPI and the NGO-consortium had tried 
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to influence by proposing new election laws, the final laws were a result of 
negotiation where both the members of parliament, the military and the middle class 
opposition that agreed on a pact with Habibie could benefit. Here the authoritarian 
regime with narrowed room to manoeuvre gave seats in parliament to the military 
who was the one who had asked the former President Suharto to withdraw. And the 
regime made it easier for the big and moderate NGO’s to form parties, while it 
became much more difficult or almost impossible for regional parties and smaller 
oppostion groups to form parties, register, and compete in the election. 
I have also discussed the difficulties of Lijphart’s (1984) theories on proportional 
representation versus district system. It seems to have been an agenda for Team of 
Seven, LIPI, the large moderate NGO’s, the members of parliament and President 
Habibie to limit the numbers of new parties contest the election. Therefore Team of 
Seven and LIPI proposed district system as the final solution, knowing that this based 
on Duverger’s Law would lead towards fewer parties. Team of Seven also kept 
another agenda when proposing district, and that was to make the members of 
parliament accountable to the voters, letting them have to compete on district level far 
away from Jakarta. Habibie could live with that, but General Chairman of Golkar 
Akbar Tanjung could not. At the same time, the uncertainty of the result of the 
fortcoming election, made it too dangerous for all groups to go for a clear district 
system that could have left some major groups without seats in parliament. The 
uncertainty and the fact that the members of parliament had lived in Jakarta for years 
and were afraid to fight for their seats in rural districts far away from Jakarta, made it 
difficult for them to go for a clearcut district system. So when Lijphart focuses on 
seat allocation as the major difference between the tow systems, the Indonesian 
debate focused on the discussion of accountability towards the electorate or the party. 
I will therefore argue that the main propelling forces behind the election laws were 
the members of the parliament with the support of the military and the moderate 
middle class opposition who joined in a pact to form the new political system. The 
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impact of the smaller NGO’s, the students and radical opposition was very little, and 
the international society seemed to stay calm in the process of making the new laws.  
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ABRI  Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
DPR  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (The People’s Representative Council) 
Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups) 
KPU  Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commision) 
LIPI  Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Science) 
MPR  Majelis Permusyawarantan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) 
NU  Nahdlatul Ulama (Rise of the Islamic Scholars) 
PAN  Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
PBB  Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party) 
PDI  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party) 
PKI  Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) 
PPP  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) 
YLBHI Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation) 
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Newspapers: 
Jakarta Post (daily in English): January 1998- December 1999 
 
Laws and Regulations: 
Indonesian law number 2 (1999) 
Indonesian law number 3 (1999) 
Indonesian law number 4 (1999) 
 
Interviews:  
During the period from August 11th through September 7th 1999 I made the following 
interviews in Jakarta. All interviews except one (Mr. Djuhad Mahja) was made in English. 
Names of persons interviewed and the positions they held at the time of the interviews are 
listed here: 
 
Bjornlund, Eric (1999). Interview at NDIs office.  August 26th. Bjornlund was Country 
Director for National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in 
Indonesia. 
Darusman, Marzuki (1999). Interview at Regent Hotel.  September 4th. Darusman was 
Deputy Chairperson of GOLKAR Chairperson of the Indonesian National 
Commission on Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM). 
Evans, Kevin (1999). Interview at Sari Pan Pacific Hotel, Jakarta. September 6th. Evans 
was electoral adviser for UNDP (United Nations Development programme) in 
Indonesia. 
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Gaffar, Afan (1999). Interview at KPU. September 7th. Gaffar was professor of political 
science professor at Gajah Mada University, Member of Team of seven, Member of 
Team 11 and government appointed member of KPU. 
Liddle, Willam (1999). Interview at Sari Pan Pacific Hotel, Jakarta. August 11th. Liddle is 
Professor of political science at Ohio State university. 
Lubis, Todung Mulya (1999). Interview at his office. August 24th. Lubis was Coordinator of 
Universities Network for Free and Fair Election (UNFREL) (1998-1999), Vice 
Chairman of the Central Board of the General Election Supervising Committee 
(PANWASLU) (1999). Member of the Board of Trustees of the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation (YLBHI).  
Mahja, Djuhad (1999). Interview (with interpretation) at KPU. September 6th. Mahja was 
PPP-delegate to KPU.  
Mallarangeng, Andi (1999). Interview at KPU. September 1st. Mallarangeng was member of 
Team of Seven, Team 11 and government appointed member of KPU. 
Nababan, Asmara (1999). Interview at his office. August 30th. Nababan was General 
secretary of the National Human Rights Commision, KOMNASHAM.  
Nasution, Adnan Buyung (1999). Interview at his office. August 31th. Nasution was Member 
of Team of eleven. 
Pabottingi, Mochtar (1999). Interview at his office. September 3rd. Pabottingi was a political 
scientist at Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI).  
Saleh, Abdul Rahman (1999). Interview at KPU. September 2nd. Saleh was PBB-delegate to 
KPU. 
Santoso (1999). Interview in his car on the way from Utan Kayo 68H to Hotel Indonesia. 
August 31th. Santoso was Deputy secretary of National Mandate Party (PAN). 
Widjojanto, Bambang (1999). Interview at his office. August 31th. Widjojanto was Director 
of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI).  
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APPENDIX  
Question guidelines for the interviews made in Jakarta  
1. Was a federal system-model never discussed in Indonesia? 
2. Was it ever discussed why all parties have to aknowledge the Pancasila 
ideology? 
3. What is the unique hybrid between PR and a majoritarian (district) system? 
Why did Golkar accept this, and how did the other parties look on this 
question? 
4. Why did ABRI acceot a decline in seats? How strong was ABRI in the process 
of creating the electoral laws, and was there ever a serious debate about not 
giving ABRI any seats in the DPR at all? 
5. What abourt the role of the civil servants? Was it ever discussed to give them 
some seats in DPR? 
6. Which were the other groups giving advices to the process of making the laws, 
in addition to the Team of Seven (Tim Tijuh)? 
7. The students were strong and were supported by the rest of the oposition when 
they demonstrated against Suharto during spring 1998. What was their role in 
the further transition process? 
8. What sort of alliances seem to have been build between the Habibie-regime 
and the oposition (PDI-P, PAN, PKB (PPP) and so forth) since they have 
managed to wipe-out all other serious oposition, the studenst and the regional 
oposition included? 
9. Why is no regional party allowed to participate, even in the local elections? 
10. Was there any real consequence by the decision that a party only need to have 
branch in nine provinces, and not in half of them as suggested? 
11. Who are the 65 and 135 members in MPR, and why chose this rather 
undemocratic model? 
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12. What is the role of KPU and Team of eleven (Tim Sebelas), and did they 
perform as expected? 
13. Which parties is allowed to participate in the next election, and is there going 
to become compromise on this issue? 
14. Is there going to be any further changes in the election laws? 
15. To understand how the election laws work, what was wrong about the 90, or 
so, parties that were not allowed to contest the elections? 
